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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FEDERAL
ABORTION LAW: WHY PROGRESSIVES MIGHT
BE TEMPTED TO EMBRACE FEDERALISM
Jordan Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Presidential candidate Ralph Nader, appearing on the political
news program "This Week," stated his belief that abortion rights did not
depend solely on the balance of liberal to conservative judges on the
Supreme Court, and thus should not be a deciding factor for voters in the
Presidential election.' "Even if Roe v. Wade is reversed, that doesn't end
it," Nader explained, "[i]t just reverts [control of abortion] back to the
states." 2 This statement caused such an uproar among progressives, who
thought Nader's comments demonstrated an indifference to abortion rights,
that Nader was still backpedaling two years after the election. 3 Still, no one
questioned his basic premise: that states would get control over abortion
rights if Roe were overturned. 4
Six years later, however, as the worrisome possibility that Roe might be
overturned has become more real, legal scholars have begun to debate this
very issue, with several conjecturing that, although the power to regulate
abortion would originally revert to the states, Congress might ultimately
take control.5 This Note explores whether, under the Supreme Court's
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Tracy Higgins for her guidance. I would also like to thank my mother for her help, my
family for their support, and Eric Kim for his support and unending patience.
1. Sally Kalson, Op-Ed., Nader Willing to Sell Out Reproductive Rights, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Nov. 1, 2000, at DI.
2. Id.
3. See Melinda Henneberger, The Green Party: Nader Sees a Bright Side to a Bush
Victory, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2000, at A29; Ralph Nader, Letter to the Editor, Nader on
Abortion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2002, at A20.
4. See Kalson, supra note 1; Bruce Ramsey, Op-Ed., Messages in the Vote: Money,
Lies, Social Security, Seattle Times, Nov. 8, 2000, at B 12; see also Lindsay Kastner, Not Too
Young to Take Part: They Can't Vote, but Young Activists Keenly Interested in Election,
Richmond Times Dispatch, Oct. 29, 2004 (quoting young organizer telling voters that "You
know, if George Bush was re-elected, he wouldn't be able to make abortion illegal.... If
Roe v. Wade was overturned, it would go back to the states").
5. See Michael McGough, Commerce Clause Conundrum: Liberals Want Judge
Roberts to Take an Expansive View of Congress' Power to Regulate Non-Economic
Activity--But Should They?, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 22, 2005, at B7 (discussing
Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe's recent speech warning that Congress could ban abortion
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current jurisprudence, Congress can regulate abortion nationally using its
power under the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the ability to
"regulate Commerce ... among the several States," 6 and describes the
confusion that currently exists in this area of the law.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been surprisingly inconsistent over
the last ten years. Between 1937 and 1995, not one statute was struck down
on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's Commerce power.7 Then, in
United States v. Lopez, the Court appeared to put new limitations on the
Commerce Clause, striking down the Guns-Free School Zone Act, which
prohibited possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school, as being
outside Congress's Commerce power. 8 The Court followed Lopez a few
years later with United States v. Morrison,9 where it struck down a section
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that allowed victims of
gender-motivated violence to sue in federal court, even though Congress
had solved some of the problems the Court had identified in the Guns-Free
School Zone Act.10 These two cases appeared to indicate a federalist
revolution in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in which the Court seemed
to be drawing lines around the types of areas that Congress can regulate. I I
While some commentators proclaimed the revival of a pre-New Deal
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 12 the revolution appears to have been
short-lived, 13 based on the Court's decision last term in Gonzales v.
Raich.14 In Raich, the Court held that the Controlled Substance Abuse Act,
which prohibits the manufacture, distribution, or possession of a number of
drugs, including marijuana, was constitutional even as applied to marijuana
that is legally grown for medical use only and has never been, and never
will be, in the stream of commerce. 15 Raich appears to mark a move back
toward the post-New Deal method of interpreting the Commerce Clause,
with a heavy emphasis on deference to congressional judgment, paired with
an expansive understanding of the Commerce power and the national
market economy.
if Roe were overturned); Jeffrey Rosen, The Day After Roe, Atlantic Monthly, June 2006, at
56, 62-64.
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on
Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 367, 368 & n.7 (2002).
8. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. Id. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of the Morrison decision.
11. Stephen G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 752 (1995).
12. Id.
13. See Herman Schwartz, A Deeply Rooted Revolution, 181 N.J. L.J. 329 (2005)
(quoting Michael Greve from the conservative American Enterprise Institute, who said that
"what seemed to be a revolution was only a 'boomlet [that] has fizzled,"' and quoting the
conservative Cato Institute's Roger Pilon calling Raich a "disaster").
14. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
15. Id. at 2215.
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Although the Raich Court claimed that its decision was consistent with
Lopez, Morrison, and fifty years of post-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, it appears impossible to reconcile these competing
understandings of the Commerce Clause. 16 Since Raich, commentators
have diverged on whether Raich was a return to the New Deal era
analysis, 17 a blip on the federalist revolution radar, 18 or a clear sign that
federalist jurisprudence is just political expedience disguised as structural
analysis. 19
The next time the Court addresses this issue, it may indicate which of
these conclusions is correct, either by veering back toward the narrow
interpretation of the Commerce Clause put forth in Lopez and Morrison, or
by returning to an interpretation of the Clause that gives Congress the
almost-plenary authority it had before Lopez. In the meantime, the Court's
confusing jurisprudence in this area leaves important questions about state
sovereignty and the limits of congressional power in areas traditionally
regulated by states, such as abortion law, unanswered. Without clear
direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts will have to choose for
themselves which of these cases provides the most guidance in particular
circumstances. 20
Progressives have generally favored a broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and have defended legislation as varied as the
Endangered Species Act and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
on Commerce Clause grounds. 2 1 However, given the fact that both the
16. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States'
Rights Legacy, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2005, at WK3 (asking, "Was the federalism revolution
ever real and, if so, what happened to it?").
17. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2005
Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 71, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2005/gonzalesdecision.pdf, John T. Parry, "Society Must Be
[Regulated] ": Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 853, 862 (2005).
18. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 879, 908 (2005).
19. See Ryan Grim, A Guide to Gonzales v. Raich, Salon.com, June 7, 2005,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/06/07/supreme-court-and-pot (referring to several
law professors railing against Justice Antonin Scalia's vote for the majority opinion in Raich
as a purely political move).
20. However, it has been noted by one commentator that most lower courts have already
been construing Lopez and Morrison as narrowly as possible in order to avoid striking down
congressional statutes. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court
Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and
Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 369, 371. Raich may provide these lower courts with the
excuse they need to continue to broadly understand the Commerce Clause despite the
"revolution" which may have come and gone at the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
21. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
et al. at 4, United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-20792), 1996 WL
33473351 ("Congress had ample authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act."); Brief of Environmental Defense et al. as amici curiae
in Support of respondents at 18, Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL 1369436 ("Congress has
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White House and Congress are currently under conservative, Republican
control, some pro-choice advocates and other progressives might now
prefer courts to adopt a narrower view of the Commerce Clause as the
lesser of two evils, considering that at least some states will most likely
keep abortion legal if left to themselves to decide.22  The present
composition of the Court presents a conundrum to pro-choice advocates:
Since the retirement of moderate conservative Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, there appears to be a five to four majority willing to uphold
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the case that
upheld but weakened Roe v. Wade.23 However, the solidity of that majority
is open to question,24 and at least two of the five votes to uphold are held by
Justices who may retire within the next few years.25
Commerce Clause power to regulate construction and operation of a solid waste landfill that
would pollute intrastate surface waters used as habitat by migratory birds."). The Supreme
Court did not actually reach the Commerce Clause issue in Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at
162.
22. See Wendy Kaminer, Sexual Congress, Am. Prospect, Feb. 14, 2000, at 8; see also
Rosen, supra note 5, at 58-62. Similar arguments have been made more often by those
defending gay rights and same-sex marriage. See Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A
Gay Liberationist Perspective, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 719, 741-43 (2003) (arguing that federalism
may not be attractive to progressives with certain cultural agendas, such as ending racism or
protecting the environment, but that it is or could be a valuable restraint when it comes to the
issue of gay rights); Paul D. Moreno, "So Long As Our System Shall Exist": Myth, History,
and the New Federalism, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 711, 742-43 (2005) (pointing to
various times in history when federalism has been embraced by either liberals or
conservatives to argue that federalism is a "content neutral" principle and mentioning gay
marriage and abortion as two issues on which liberals are currently, or are likely to start,
using federalism arguments). In fact, several commentators have argued that federalism
concerns should cause the Defense of Marriage Act to be unconstitutional. See John Bash,
Abandoning Bedrock Principles?: The Musgrave Amendment and Federalism, 27 Harv. J.
L. & Pub. Pol'y 985, 987 (2004); Melissa Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and
Federalism: A States' Rights Argument in Defense of Same-Sex Marriages, 31 Fam. L.Q.
571, 573 (1997); see also Martin Schram, A Year of Flip-Flops, Naples Daily News, Dec.
29, 2004, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2004/dec/29/ndn-martinschram-a-yearof
flip-flops/ ("In 2004, 'states' rights' was the rallying cry sounded mainly by liberals who
were pushing their favorite solution for legal same-sex marriages .... But in the 1950s and
1960s, cries of 'states' rights' were played on the flip side. It was the conservatives who
made 'states' rights' their mantra ... ").
23. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law
Could Change the Supreme Court, New Yorker, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
24. Recently, commentators and journalists have begun discussing Justice Anthony
Kennedy's position on abortion, and there is at least some concern that his position is no
longer strongly in favor of upholding Roe. A recent New Yorker profile noted Justice
Kennedy's strong dissent from the Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, in which he
described so-called "partial-birth" abortion as "'a procedure many decent and civilized
people find so abhorrent as to be among the most serious of crimes against human life."' Id.
at 51 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 979 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). He
also dissented in a case that challenged the use of RICO to prosecute abortion clinic
protestors, writing that "in the face of what they consider to be one of life's gravest moral
crises, [the Court is denying them] even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little
pamphlet, a handheld paper seeking to reach a higher law." Id. When asked if he would be
the one vote keeping Roe intact, Justice Kennedy answered, "Perhaps, perhaps not." Id.
25. In 2005, Justice John Paul Stevens was eighty-five years old, and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsberg was seventy-two, which facts alone could mean that one or both will retire within
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However, several of the justices who firmly oppose abortion also
strongly endorse state sovereignty and oppose a broad view of
congressional power.26 If a conservative Supreme Court overturns Roe,
reproductive rights advocates will try to prevent a national abortion ban,
and some commentators have suggested that one strategy could be to
challenge federal abortion laws as violations of the Commerce Clause. 27
While that legal argument might be effective, pursuing this strategy in court
could set precedent foreclosing important protections for women's
reproductive rights, such as protections for clinics, 28 as well as other
important social legislation enacted by Congress, including environmental 29
and civil rights legislation,30 by constricting congressional power to address
national problems.3 1
Part I of this Note discusses the trajectory of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence from the Founding until today, including a discussion of the
fundamental inconsistencies in Lopez, Morrison, Raich and the post-New
Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part I also describes how the
Commerce Clause has been used in the past to legislate on national issues
such as race discrimination, environmental protections, and most recently,
abortion. Finally, Part I describes the opposing views about what level of
power the Commerce Clause gives Congress and whether Congress can
legitimately regulate abortion under the Commerce Clause.
Part II of this Note compares how courts adopting divergent views about
the Commerce Clause might rule on federal abortion legislation. This
section uses the Freedom of Choice Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, and a
hypothetical "national abortion ban," which could be passed if Roe were
the next five to ten years. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate
Gives Approval, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2006, at A2 1.
26. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 319, 321 (2005) (noting that the "same
Justices who have spearheaded the restraints on the Commerce Clause... are also the most
adamantly opposed to abortion").
27. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1789
(1995); Phillip Hankersley, United States v. Morrison: Sex, Violence, and the Reach of
Federal Power, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 21, 21 (2004); Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20 Const. Comment. 441, 461-462
(2004); Alissa Schecter, Note, Choosing Balance: Congressional Powers and the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1987, 1989 (2005).
28. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
29. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
30. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
31. See Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Clear the Air: Gonzalez v. Raich,
the "Comprehensive Scheme" Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered
Species Act, 35 Envtl. L. 491, 491 (2005) (discussing the relief with which Raich was
greeted by environmentalists); Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After
Morrison: An Examination of the Child Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence
Abusers, 25 Harv. Women's L.J. 57 (2002) (discussing the repercussions of Morrison and
how important legislation could be struck down based on Morrison and Lopez, arguing that
Morrison was wrongly decided).
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overturned, as examples of the kinds of legislation that Congress has, or
could, enact based on the Commerce Clause. 32
Part III argues first that there is no way to interpret Lopez, Morrison,
Raich and the post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence consistently,
and second, that there should be a resolution of this inconsistency that
returns to a broad interpretation of Congress's Commerce power. This
argument will make clear that a broad construction must be adopted in order
to allow Congress to solve national problems in the most efficacious way;
as a collateral result, abortion must be considered regulable in most cases
by Congress within the constitutional bounds defined by the Supreme
Court.33 Therefore, in order to protect the right to choose today, and in the
future if Roe is limited or overturned, this Note argues that the pro-choice
movement must pursue political solutions, rather than a Commerce Clause
judicial solution. Congress may have a great deal of power over abortion in
a post-Roe world, and this Note argues that if pro-choice advocates want to
protect choice, they must fight to protect Roe, find other constitutional
protections for abortion, and lastly, make sure that the elected officials in
Congress are pro-choice.
The first section of Part I describes the basic uses of the Commerce
Clause and sets out the doctrinal conflict that exists among the Court's
decisions in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ABORTION
The United States Constitution grants limited and enumerated powers to
the federal government, leaving all other powers to the states and the
people. 34 One of the primary sources of congressional power is the
Commerce Clause, which was included in the Constitution primarily
because the conflicting, protectionist policies adopted by individual states
under the Articles of Confederation were destroying America's ability to
become an economic power.35 During the last century, the Commerce
Clause has become one of Congress's most significant sources of power,
and the foundation for federal regulation of activities ranging from
32. McGough, supra note 5 (quoting Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe's recent speech
warning that Congress could ban abortion if Roe were overturned).
33. Even with a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, however, certain types of
legislation may remain off-limits to Congress. For example, a proposed law dubbed the
Parental Notification and Intervention Act would impose a national parental consent
requirement on minors seeking abortions. Parental Notification and Intervention Act, H.R.
2971, 109th Cong. (2005). Under any interpretation of the Commerce Clause, this sort of
domestic-relations-type law might be considered beyond the scope of congressional powers.
See infra Part IIA-B. For a brief further discussion of this law and one other proposed
abortion law, see infra note 183.
34. See U.S. Const. amend. IX, X (granting all powers not specifically given to Congress
to the states and the people).
35. See Robert Pushaw, Jr. & Grant Nelson, Essay, A Critique of the Narrow
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 704 (2002).
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interstate shipping rates36 to restaurants 37 to employment contracts.
38
Although the Framers of the Constitution may not have foreseen these
particular uses of the Clause, 39 much of our modem day legislation relies on
the Commerce Clause for its authority. 40
An ongoing debate exists about whether the expansion of the Commerce
Clause for social and economic national legislation, as opposed to being
used for directly regulating trade between the states, oversteps the grant of
power given by the Constitution to Congress. The first phase of this debate
occurred in the 1920s, when the Supreme Court invalidated attempts by
Congress to expand the reach of the Commerce power.4 1 However, this
strict approach changed in 1937,42 and for almost fifty years afterwards, the
Court did not restrict the Commerce power. The third phase of this debate
began after the Lopez decision, which revitalized the limits on the
Commerce power and began a new discussion of the value of dividing and
policing federal versus state powers.
The Supreme Court decided Lopez while it was in the process of
revisiting the legal landscape of federal and state power. In the few years
before and after Lopez, the Court drew new lines and emphasized old lines
between federal and state power, strengthening state immunity and
sovereignty and limiting federal power to force states to act. 43  For
example, just two years before Lopez, in New York v. United States, the
Court held that Congress did not have the power to force states to take title
to nuclear waste within their own states.44 This new attention to the
division of power between the federal and state government prompted
confusion among the lower courts45 and heated commentary in legal
36. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S.
342 (1914).
37. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
38. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
39. See Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 35, at 705.
40. Bill Adair, Roberts Faces New Challenge: A Clause, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 2,
2005, at Al (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer, Democrat from New York, saying that "[tihe
whole foundation of federal regulation since the early 1900s has been on the basis of the
Commerce Clause").
41. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text
43. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice
of Medicine, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 149, 155 nn.23-25 (2004) (discussing the Court's decisions
that, among other holdings, invalidated part of the Americans with Disabilities Act as
applied to state employers, invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and held that
the federal government cannot "commandeer" state officials to implement federal
legislation).
44. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (D. Utah 2004)
(holding that a statute that prohibited sexual exploitation of children was unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant because it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that the Child
Support Recovery Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its
Commerce power in enacting FACE).
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periodicals. 46 The new debate surrounding the Commerce Clause focused
first on whether the fundamental limitation was based on whether the
regulated activity was "economic" in nature, or only whether it had an
"economic" effect on commerce; and second, it focused on whether there
were some areas that were so traditionally regulated by states, such as
family law or education, that states were to be considered sovereign in those
areas regardless of their economic implications. 47
The questions left open after Lopez, Morrison, and Raich are how to
divide state and federal authority and whether that boundary is judicially
enforceable. The majority opinion in Raich leaves the impression that that
boundary is generally not judicially enforceable, 48 whereas Lopez and
Morrison clearly held that it was. 49
The next section lays out the Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it stood
before Lopez, beginning with the first major Commerce Clause decision in
1887 and continuing through the New Deal and the Civil Rights movement.
A. The "Old" Commerce Clause: The Categorical Approach to
Commerce, the New Deal Revolution, and Civil Rights
Between 1787 and the early 1900s, the Commerce Clause was interpreted
fairly narrowly. The first important case to address the Commerce Clause
was Gibbons v. Ogden, where federal legislation prohibiting monopolies
clashed with a New York law that permitted a boat owner to have a
monopoly over a particular area of the Hudson River. 50 The Court held that
the federal legislation was a legitimate use of the Commerce Clause, and
therefore overrode New York's law, because transporting people from New
46. See Calabresi, supra note 11; David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking
Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 Conn L. Rev. 59,
111 (1997) (noting that "federalism makes a substantial contribution to domestic tranquility
in the United States by assuring that many contentious, divisive moral issues may have a
multiplicity of resolutions, rather than a winner-take-all decision at the national level");
Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding the Proper
Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 693 (2005)
(defending the wisdom of Lopez and Morrison and arguing the benefits of dual federalism);
see also Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 35, at 716-19 (arguing against restriction of the
federal government's power and the use of the Commerce Clause).
47. See Dailey, supra note 27, at 1790 ("States enjoy exclusive authority over family
law, not because families are in some sense noncommercial, as the Lopez majority
suggested, but instead because of the fundamental role of localism in the federal design."
(footnote omitted)).
48. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Bramon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five
Takes, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 915, 932-33 (2005) (discussing the possible meanings of
Raich for Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the effects of Raich on the standards created
in Lopez and Morrison).
49. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[W]hether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can
be settled finally only by this Court."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 74-75 (1824).
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York to New Jersey involved interstate commerce. 51 However, the early
Court distinguished "commerce" between states from manufacturing or
other kinds of activities where some activity happened intrastate and was
then sent or brought into interstate commerce. 52 This distinction between
manufacturing and commerce caused the Court to firmly reject Congress's
efforts to legislate for broader national purposes, particularly in the area of
labor and employment. 53
A massive about-face occurred in 1937, substantially changing the
purpose and use of the Commerce Clause. In response to the New Deal, the
Court redefined Congress's power to regulate some commerce that began
with intrastate activity. 54
The first case to develop this new jurisprudence was NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.5 5 The National Labor Relations Act created a right
for employees across the nation to bargain collectively and also established
51. Id.
52. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895) (holding that
manufacturing is a precursor to commerce and not part of commerce).
53. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918) (striking down a statute
prohibiting interstate commerce of goods made with child labor); see also Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936) (holding that Congress could not set up boards across
the country to set minimum prices for coal); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 530, 551 (1935) (holding that the National Industrial Recovery Act, which
authorized the President to "approve codes of fair competition," was unconstitutional);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage statute as
exceeding Congress's Commerce power). Two exceptions developed to the otherwise strict
understanding of "interstate commerce" as trade between and among states. The first was
where the item to be brought into interstate commerce was "immoral" on its own, such as
lottery tickets or women who were intending to prostitute themselves in other states, in
which case Congress was found to have the power to prevent the item from traveling through
interstate commerce. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903) (upholding congressional legislation prohibiting the shipment of
lottery tickets across state lines because lottery tickets were "pestilien[t]" and "evil"). The
second involved activity that affected the stream of commerce, such as situations where
intrastate regulation negatively affected the flow of interstate activity. See Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914); see also United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). For example, in the Shreveport Rate Cases,
where carriers in Texas set shipping rates very low for shipments in-state and very high for
shipments from out-of-state into Texas seeking to promote intrastate activity, the Court
found that this protectionist kind of activity had "a close and substantial relation to interstate
traffic" and thus could be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Shreveport
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351.
54. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Supreme Court reversed its
direction from the previous era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which had limited
congressional power. Many have theorized that this was in response to a threat by President
Roosevelt to "pack the court" with judges who would be more receptive to the New Deal
agenda. See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evans Hughes: The Center Holds, 83
N.C. L. Rev. 1187, 1201 (2005) (noting that the Court's shift to the center is supposed to
have saved the Court at that time). This is often called "the switch in time [that] saved nine."
Id. West Coast Hotel upheld the constitutionality of Washington State's minimum wage
laws, which protected women and minors and overturned Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923), which had struck down a minimum wage law in the District of Columbia.
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
55. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to supervise and enforce the
Act's prohibition of unfair labor practices. 56 In the Act's "findings"
section, Congress had outlined the negative national economic effects of
local unfair labor practices, including obstructing the flow of commerce and
hampering efficient market competition.57 The Court upheld the Act,
recognizing that while some of the activities reached by the Act were
intrastate, their effects on interstate commerce were so substantial as to
allow Congress to reach them as well. 58 This decision opened the door to a
line of cases that gradually increased Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause until it appeared to be plenary.59
The highwater mark of this expansionist reading was Wickard v. Filburn,
where the Court held that the "aggregation principle" allowed Congress to
reach any activity that itself was completely local but that, when aggregated
with all other similar activity, had an effect on interstate commerce. 60 In
Wickard, a single farmer was fined for growing wheat in excess of the
amount permitted by the Agricultural Adjustment Act and defended himself
by claiming that his wheat was grown solely for personal use and not to
enter the market in any capacity. 61 The Court upheld the legislation,
reasoning that while Wickard himself did not necessarily affect interstate
commerce, if all single farmers were to grow wheat for themselves, the
aggregation of this activity would have an effect on the whole market.62
After the New Deal, Congress began legislating against social evils, such
as discrimination, under the guise of the Commerce power. 63 In Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibited restaurants and hotels that operated "in interstate
commerce" from discriminating based on race, as a valid exercise of the
power to regulate interstate commerce.64 The Court held that because
millions of people of all races travel across the United States and the
congressional findings in the Act indicated "a qualitative as well as
quantitative effect on interstate travel by Negroes... racial discrimination
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 23-24. Congress generally includes a "findings" section in its Acts that
explains the reasons behind its actions and sometimes the constitutional basis for the Act.
Although Congress has generally included such findings, their significance has increased
since Lopez. See infra Part I.B.
58. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41-42.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured
by employees who were paid less than a prescribed minimum wage or who worked less than
a prescribed maximum number of hours, thereby overturning Hammer v. Dagenhardt, 247
U.S. 251 (1918)).
60. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61. Id. at 119.
62. Id. at 127-28.
63. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2000)).
64. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
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had the effect of discouraging travel. '65 The Court also held that the power
to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate "local
incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that
commerce."
66
After the Court established the aggregation principle and upheld the Civil
Rights Act, it seemed as if the Commerce Clause granted Congress
practically plenary authority, and this understanding stood unchallenged for
the next thirty years. The following section describes "new" federalism,
which is a jurisprudence that harkens back to some extent to the pre-New
Deal philosophy of the Commerce power. The following section then
discusses the three cases that form the basis of the Commerce Clause
confusion that now exists: Lopez, Morrison, and Raich.
B. Federalism and the "New" Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The expansion of federal power during the second half of the twentieth
century has not been without its detractors. 67 These detractors have pushed
for a "new" federalism, or rather a return to what they believe are the
federalist principles of the Founding. 68 Proponents of the "new" federalism
have emphasized the fact that the federal government is one of limited and
enumerated powers and that the federal government can only regulate in
areas that are expressly delineated in the Constitution.69  Many
commentators have written in support of this enforcement of the "vertical"
separation of powers in the United States federalist system.70 Professor
Stephen Calabresi, for example, extols the virtues of the federalist system,
in which fifty states with competing and differing priorities and moralities
can resolve most issues in their own ways, leaving only those problems in
65. Id.
66. Id. at 258. The companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel was Katzenbach v.
McClung, which concerned a restaurant in Alabama that served mostly local people,
although it was located eleven blocks from an interstate highway and got most of its food
from an intermediary that bought its supplies from out-of-state. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294,
296 (1964). The Court relied on congressional testimony demonstrating that discrimination
in restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive effect on interstate travel by blacks, noting
that "one can hardly travel without eating." Id. at 300. The Court found that "[h]ere, as [in
Darby], Congress has determined for itself that refusals of service to Negroes have imposed
burdens both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products
generally." Id. at 303.
67. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Newest Judicial Activists Come from the Right, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1987, at E24 (discussing the rise of the Federalist Society and then-Judge Scalia's
part in it).
68. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 101 (2001).
69. See Westover, supra note 46, at 695.
70. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 89, 110-12 (2004); see also
Calabresi, supra note 11, at 752; Hankersley, supra note 27, at 21; Westover, supra note 46,
at 748.
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need of a federal solution to the federal government. 71 Others have pointed
out that by allowing states to resolve important moral issues on their own,
the United States avoids governing by "congressional fiat," 72 and states are
able to experiment and respond to problems within their own borders in
unique ways. 73 Furthermore, keeping the lines between federal and state
governmental powers clear can be seen as a way to protect areas of law,
such as family law, which could be disserved by being placed under federal
jurisdiction.74
On the other hand, over the last forty years, national problems have
increasingly been solved on a national level by using Congress's
enumerated powers in new ways that are responsive to the changing
economy and infrastructure of the country. 75 The Civil Rights Act, 76 the
Endangered Species Act,77 and the Clean Water Act 78 are all examples of
how the expansive interpretation of enumerated congressional powers has
enabled Congress to legislate to address national problems that it has
considered ineffectively addressed on the local level. 79
While no court or commentator seems to argue that Congress should be
considered to have the broad police powers possessed by states, 80 a more
expansive understanding of congressional powers doubtless allows
Congress to enter areas of the law that have been considered the domain of
the states. 81 Some commentators have argued that judicial review of these
decisions sometimes puts the judiciary in the awkward position of
prohibiting elected branches of government from acting in the ways that are
best suited for their constituencies. 82 Rather than inserting themselves into
these intergovernmental power shifts, these commentators argue that courts
should leave these issues to be fought in the political realm by officials who
are accountable to each other and to voters.83
Through discussion of Lopez and Morrison, the next section shows how
the direction of the Court in recent years has tended to reflect this criticism,
71. Calabresi, supra note 11, at 774-79.
72. Comment, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 and Physician-Assisted Suicide:
A Call for Congressional Self-Restraint, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 297, 310 (2001).
73. See Calabresi, supra note 11, at 777.
74. See Hankersley, supra note 27, at 21-22.
75. See Law, supra note 7, at 371; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281a, 1294-97 (2000).
79. See Pushaw, supra note 18, at 860.
80. State police powers are generally described as encompassing the states' ability to
"define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens."
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. See Law, supra note 7, at 376; see also Mark R. Killenbeck, In(Re)Dignity: The
New Federalism in Perspective, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 39 (2004).
82. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 64-
65 (2005); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 287-89, 289 n.283 (2000).
83. Kramer, supra note 82, at 217-20.
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emphasizing the limitations of federal power even in situations where state
governments have welcomed the federal government's action in an area of
the law that had previously been left to the states.8 4 The section concludes
by discussing Raich and the reversal that appears to have taken place.
1. A Return to Limited Commerce Power? United States v. Lopez and
United States v. Morrison
In Lopez, the Court addressed the validity of the Guns-Free School Zone
Act, which made it a federal crime for a person knowingly to possess a
firearm in a school zone.8 5 The legislation did not contain a "jurisdictional
element," meaning that the statute did not require that the firearm have a
relationship to interstate commerce; nor did it include any "findings" to
explain how the activity to be regulated fell within Congress's authority by
impacting interstate commerce. 86 In discussing this statute, the Lopez
majority identified a new framework under which to analyze legislation,
pointing to three areas in which Congress can legislate under the Commerce
Clause:
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce....
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.... Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having
a substantial relation to interstate commerce.8 7
The Court stated that while Congress "normally is not required to make
formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce," the fact that the activity in question had "no...
substantial effect [on commerce that] was visible to the naked eye" made it
more difficult for the Court to find that Congress had a rational basis for
believing the activity to be connected to interstate commerce. 88 The Court
also appeared to add an additional consideration, holding that because
"[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity," it therefore could not be held to substantially affect interstate
commerce, 89 even though the post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases had
84. For example, thirty-five states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed an
amicus brief defending Congress's power to enact the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), part of which was struck down on Commerce Clause grounds in United States v.
Morrison. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners'
Brief on the Merits at 1, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-5)
(petitioning the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to reverse the lower court's decision to
strike down parts of VAWA "[b]ecause the amici agree with Congress that gender-based
violence substantially affects interstate commerce and the States cannot address this problem
adequately by themselves").
85. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
86. Id. at 561.
87. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 562-63.
89. Id. at 567.
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upheld statutes because the activity had an "economic" effect regardless of
whether the activity itself was "economic." 90
Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice O'Connor concurred in the Lopez
decision, writing a far more states' rights-centered opinion than the
majority. Whereas the majority focused on the constitutional limitations of
congressional power regardless of the general subject matter being
regulated, the concurring opinion emphasized the importance of preserving
traditional areas of state regulation. 91 Justice Kennedy's concurrence noted
that there is a need for stability in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 92 but
also stated that "[i]t does not follow, however, that in every instance the
Court lacks the authority and responsibility to review congressional
attempts to alter the federal balance." 93 The concurrence also repeatedly
stated that where Congress sought to regulate in an area of "traditional state
concern," 94 the Court had a responsibility to "preserv[e] the federal
balance." 95
A few years later, the Court clarified and broadened this "new" federalist
direction in Morrison, addressing a challenge to VAWA, which "provide[d]
a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence." 96 In
this Act, unlike the Gun-Free School Zone Act, Congress had provided
substantial findings, linking gender-motivated violence to economic effects
on employment and travel across states, and finding that nationally "we
spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and other
social costs of domestic violence." 97
Despite these findings, the Court found that this statute, too, was an
invalid exercise of the Commerce power.98 The Court held that "even
under our modem, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress's regulatory authority is not without effective bounds."
99
Analyzing VAWA under the third category of congressional power
identified in Lopez, those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, the Court stated that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." 100 Similar to the statute
in Lopez, VAWA dealt with "noneconomic, criminal" activity, and, as in
Lopez, the justification for the statute was based on "costs of crime" and
90. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that "if appellee's activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"); see also
infra note 132.
91. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 574.
93. Id. at 575.
94. Id. at 580.
95. Id. at 575.
96. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
97. Id. at 632 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
99. Id. at 608.
100. Id. at 613.
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"national productivity" arguments. 1 1 Even though this statute had both a
jurisdictional element and substantial congressional findings, two statutory
elements that were not present in the firearm law in Lopez, the Court
reiterated its statement from Lopez that "'simply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce
does not necessarily make it so." ' 10 2  The Court again emphasized its
concern that these types of arguments could extend congressional powers
beyond any limits, "since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."' 03
Ultimately, Morrison clarified the concept of the "non-infinity" principle
only alluded to in Lopez, emphasizing that no congressional findings or
jurisdictional element would be valid if such findings or rationale could
logically be extended to any or every other type of activity.' 4
Justices David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and
Stephen Breyer dissented in both Lopez and Morrison.10 5 Justice Souter
argued that these decisions flew in the face of fifty years of pro-federal
government Commerce Clause precedent, despite the majority's contention
that these cases were compatible with the earlier cases.106 Further, Souter
argued that the role of the Court was not to decide whether the activities in
question had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but rather whether
Congress had a rational basis for so concluding. 0 7 Justice Breyer agreed
that the decision was inapposite to the post-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, arguing that the economic/noneconomic distinction
identified by the majority in Lopez and Morrison was inconsistent with
previous holdings, and that the majority was wrong in focusing on the
source of any interstate effect, pointing out that the "Court has long held
that only the interstate commercial effects, not the local nature of the cause,
are constitutionally relevant."'1 8 Justice Breyer pushed for a return to the
plenary view of the Commerce power, arguing that it is impossible for
courts to draw meaningful lines in a country knit together by economic and
101. Id. at 611-14 (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)). The
arguments raised in defense of the Guns-Free School Zone Act and VAWA were very
similar. In Lopez, the government argued that guns in a school zone deterred learning, which
affected the performance of those students later in life in their careers and therefore affected
their productivity and the economy. 514 U.S. at 564. In Morrison, Congress had made
extensive findings that violence against women caused those women to be unable to go to
work, to travel across state lines, and otherwise to contribute to the economy, and thus
violence against women affected the national economy by limiting productivity of women
workers and causing their travel and other commercial activity to be limited. 529 U.S at 615.
102. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
103. Id. at 615-16.
104. Id. at 608; see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and
Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55
Ark. L. Rev. 1253, 1260 (2003).
105. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 634.
108. Id. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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technological progress, and that the challenge of balancing federal and state
authority should therefore be left to the political, rather than judicial,
arena. 109
2. Backing up Again: United States v. Raich
After Lopez and Morrison, lower courts addressed over 200 challenges to
statutes under the Commerce Clause, including the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act,1 10 the Hobbs Act,I Il the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act,112 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 113
the Endangered Species Act," l4 and others. Although a few district courts
have invalidated federal statutes under the Lopez and Morrison reasoning,
circuit courts have generally upheld these statutes.115
The Court's decision in Raich had been anticipated as the Court's
opportunity to answer some of the lingering questions left by Lopez and
Morrison. Although these decisions set forth the three categories of activity
that can be regulated by Congress, they left open important questions for
future Commerce Clause cases, including whether the aggregation principle
had been completely abandoned, how important it would be that a particular
area of the law had traditionally been regulated by the states if Congress
chose to regulate in that area, and exactly what it means to be part of a
"broader regulatory scheme." 16
Raich arose from a conflict between a California law that legalized
marijuana for use by severely and terminally ill patients and the Controlled
Substance Act (CSA), which prohibits the sale or use of marijuana."17
Angel Raich and several other petitioners attempted to have a federal
district court enjoin the Drug Enforcement Agency from enforcing the CSA
109. Id.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
114. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
115. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 104, at 1266-97 (discussing district court
decisions that struck down convictions for simple gun possession, felony gun possession,
machine gun possession, Hobbs Act violations, and violations of the Child Support Recovery
Act, based on Lopez and Morrison, and discussing how circuit courts have uniformly
reversed those decisions). A small number of courts have held that some of these laws are
unconstitutional as applied to particular defendants. See United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d
1303, 1327 (11 th Cir. 2005) (holding that as applied to the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 2 251(a),
prohibiting the production of child pornography, was unconstitutional); United States v.
Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1068-70 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the same law was
unconstitutional as applied to this defendant); United States v. Matthews, 300 F. Supp. 2d
1220, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (holding that parts of the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act were unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as applied to intrastate
production and possession of child pornography).
116. Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 957, 966, 969 (2005).
117. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198-2201 (2005).
[Vol. 75
2006] THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FEDERAL ABORTION LAW 317
against their legal home use of marijuana in California.1 8 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it was likely that the respondents
would succeed with their Commerce Clause challenge to the CSA, and
reversed the district court's decision to deny the injunction. 119 However,
the Supreme Court held, in a six to three decision, that the CSA was a valid
use of the Commerce power even as applied to medical marijuana patients
in California. 120
a. The Majority Opinion
The Raich Court emphasized that neither Morrison nor Lopez had
overruled any of the Court's earlier Commerce Clause precedent, and
therefore any decision would have to be consistent both with these two
decisions and the cases from the last fifty years.1 2 1 The Court summarized
its jurisprudence as standing for the proposition that Congress has the
power to "regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class
of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. ' 122 The
majority then applied the three-category framework from Lopez,123
assessing the CSA under the third Lopez category. 124
The Court included a lengthy comparison of the CSA to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act challenged in Wickard.12 5 The Court wrote that, like
wheat, small personal crops of marijuana could be aggregated, even if, as in
Wickard, they were not intended for commerce, and therefore the court
concluded that Congress could regulate even noncommercial marijuana. 126
Despite the emphasis on congressional findings in both Lopez and Morrison
(and, in fact, in Wickard127), the Court rejected the necessity for such
118. Id. at 2200. Raich began with a stand-off between agents of the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and local officials in California, who spent three hours arguing at a co-
defendant's home before the DEA agents seized and destroyed the co-defendant's six
cannabis plants. Id. The local California officials had determined that she possessed the
plants in accordance with the requirements of local law and had attempted to keep the DEA
agents from seizing them, but were unsuccessful. Id.
119. Id. at 2200-01.
120. Id. at 2201.
121. See id. at 2209.
122. Id. at 2205.
123. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
124. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
125. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. The Court quoted the Wickard
opinion, which held that the fact that "'appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial."' Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-
28 (1942)).
126. Id. at 2205-06. The Court stated that "[w]hen Congress decides that the 'total
incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."
Id. at 2206.
127. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127 (discussing in detail the impact of homegrown wheat on
the wheat trade in the country, noting that "[t]he effect of consumption of homegrown wheat
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findings, stating that the Court "ha[s] never required Congress to make
particularized findings in order to legislate," and that it was not significant
that the CSA contained no findings at all about the impact of medical
marijuana on the market. 128 The majority opinion echoed the dissents in
Morrison and Lopez, 129 summing up by noting that the "task before [the
Court] is a modest one," emphasizing that the Court's role is to analyze
only whether Congress could have rationally concluded that the activity in
question substantially affects interstate commerce, and holding that in this
situation, Congress could have done so. 130
Although the majority in Raich seems to agree more with the dissents
than majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison, the opinion kept the three-
category framework of Lopez as well as the focus on the economic nature of
the activity being regulated, rather than the economic effect of the activity
being regulated. 131  This distinction remains a difference between the
"new" Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the post-New Deal
jurisprudence.] 32 However, as discussed below, Justice Scalia, at least,
on interstate commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the
disappearance of the wheat crop").
128. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208. Contra United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
In addition, the Court discussed other, related congressional findings about the harm caused
by marijuana, as the reason Congress passed the legislation. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. The
Court noted that despite the fact that the findings on which Congress had based this
legislation-that marijuana had no "effective medical use"-were most likely wrong,
Congress still deserved deference and that Congress could always go back and change the
law if they became convinced that their findings were inaccurate. Id. at 2211 n.37.
129. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
130. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198. Another important aspect of the decision in Raich was
that the Court appeared to foreclose any further possibility of as-applied Commerce Clause
challenges. Id. at 2209 ("[W]e have often reiterated that [w]here the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class." (internal quotations omitted)).
131. Id. at 2210-12.
132. While the Raich majority claims to be relying on longstanding Commerce Clause
jurisprudence for the idea that the activity to be regulated should be economic in nature, even
the case quoted for support does not actually stand for that proposition: While Raich states
that "[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate ... activities ... that are
part of an economic 'class of activities[.]' the Court quotes Wickard's holding that an
activity "whatever its nature, [may] be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 2205-06 (internal citations omitted). This
distinction is slight but important. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court
discussed at length the economic effects that the racial discrimination being regulated had
upon interstate commerce but never once mentioned the economic nature of racial
discrimination or whether this was a necessary element. 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). It does
not seem plausible that the Court at that point required such an element because racial
discrimination in and of itself is not an "economic" activity, even under the definition used
by the majority in Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (stating that "'[e]conomics' refers to the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities" (internal quotations omitted)).
Instead, the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel stated that "the power of Congress to promote
interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including
local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial
and harmful effect upon that commerce," leaving aside completely the issue of whether those
"local activities" were economic or not. 379 U.S. at 258.
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does not believe that this distinction is generally necessary, 133 and since the
Court concludes that personal possession of a small amount of marijuana
intended for medical use fits within a class of activities that are
,,economic,"1 34 this distinction may be meaningless.
b. The Concurrence in Judgment
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia both joined the majority opinions in
Lopez and Morrison, and were then part of the six-vote majority to uphold
the CSA. 135 Justice Scalia, however, concurred only in the judgment in
Raich.136 Justice Scalia found that the CSA was not simply a constitutional
use of the Commerce power, but rather, was constitutional only because of
the way that Congress may use the Necessary and Proper Clause to
effectively regulate with the Commerce Clause. 137  Scalia stated that
"Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not
themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and
Proper Clause"'138 and further that "the power to enact laws enabling
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation
effective."' 139 In particular, Justice Scalia emphasized that "[w]here
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves
substantially affect interstate commerce" and that "Congress may regulate
even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce."1 40 The emphasis on the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Raich is interesting since the Clause was
mentioned only in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lopez and
Morrison, where Justice Scalia was part of the majority. 141
133. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
134. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-07 (noting that it does not matter if individual instances of
an activity are not economic if the class of activities as a whole can be considered
economic).
135. Id. at 2198, 2215; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995).
136. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215.
137. See id. at 2215-20. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its
enumerated powers. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 18.
138. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216.
139. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2216-17.
141. In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the framers
of the Constitution could not have intended the Commerce Clause to include the power to
regulate activities that substantially affected interstate commerce because they would not
have needed to specify a variety of other congressional powers, including Congress's power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, if they had so understood the Commerce Clause.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 587-88 (1995). In his dissent in Morrison, Justice
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In arguing that Raich does not depart from Lopez or Morrison, Justice
Scalia appeared to reconceptualize the main stumbling block of the statute
in Lopez as being that the gun statute was not part of a broader regulatory
scheme. 142 Justice Scalia argued that Lopez and Morrison stand for the
proposition that "Congress may not regulate certain 'purely local' activity
within the States based solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may
have in the interstate market," and therefore that the majority decision here
did not depart from those cases. 143
c. The Dissent144
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, along with then-Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented because they believed that the decision in Raich ran counter to the
decisions in Lopez and Morrison. Writing for the three Justices, O'Connor
argued that in light of the majority's opinion, Lopez no longer provided
meaningful limits on congressional power, but was left as "nothing more
than a drafting guide" for Congress. 145  The dissent stressed that the
fundamental purpose of policing the limitations of the Commerce Clause,
which the Court did in Lopez and Morrison, is to "protect historic spheres
of state sovereignty" and "maintain the distribution of power fundamental
to our federalist system of government."' 146 Further, the dissent argued that
the Founders had intended the states to be able to "try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country," and that this
decision gives Congress the ability to broadly regulate in areas that should
be left to the states. 147
C. The Tenth Amendment and the Traditional Areas of State Regulation
The words of Justice O'Connor in the Raich dissent echo the concerns
stated in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez-specifically, that there
are traditional areas of state regulation that Congress should not be
permitted to intrude upon' 48-and both opinions seem to be based on the
David Souter wrote that the Commerce Clause could not be limited in its reach so that it
never could reach noneconomic activity because of the Necessary and Proper Clause. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640 (2000).
142. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. Id. at2218.
144. Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he discussed his own theory of the
Commerce Clause, essentially that it should be interpreted as it had been before the New
Deal cases, limiting its power so that it could not reach, for example, manufacturing or
employment law. Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This dissent echoes Justice Thomas's
concurrences in both Lopez and Morrison. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, since Justice
Thomas's philosophy has never gained support from any other member of the Court, this
Note does not provide any discussion of his separate opinions.
145. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2220.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 91-95, 146, and accompanying text.
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concerns that underlie Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. The Tenth
Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people." 149 This has been interpreted as giving states
a general police power that the federal government does not possess.
150
Recently, the Tenth Amendment has garnered increased attention as the
Court has restricted federal authority in favor of state sovereignty. 151 The
Court stated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority that
"undoubtedly" there are "limits on the Federal Government's power to
interfere with state functions." 152 However, the Court has not gone much
further in fleshing out the Tenth Amendment restriction other than citing
the Tenth Amendment as the reason Congress cannot force states to treat
their nuclear waste in any particular way, 153 or "commandeer" state or local
government officials to carry out federal programs. 154
While neither Morrison nor Lopez explicitly describes the Tenth
Amendment as placing limitations on the Commerce Clause, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez indirectly implicates the Tenth
Amendment in referring to "traditional areas" of state concern.
15 5
Moreover, at least one commentator has argued that both Lopez and
Morrison effectively use the Tenth Amendment to limit congressional
power.' 56 One commentator pointed out that Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Lopez is consistent with an earlier Supreme Court case, holding that "an
149. U.S. Const. amend. X.
150. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649-53 (1948) (upholding a conviction under a
state law, discussing at length the importance of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
151. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that
Congress cannot impose wage and hours requirements on state employers under the Fair
Labor Standards Act); see also Daan Braveman et. al., Constitutional Law: Structure and
Rights in Our Federal System 435 (2005); supra note 43 and accompanying text. In
National League of Cities, the Court held that although the federal government has the
power to enact wage and hours standards, the Tenth Amendment limits the federal
government's ability to override state sovereignty to do so. 426 U.S. at 843-47. This
standard is based on the idea that states were immune from federal power in areas where
states had traditionally been sovereign and was overturned nine years later in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985).
152. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
153. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
154. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
155. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 61 n.9. Some commentators have noted this
language and theorized that Justice Kennedy and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who joined
in this concurrence, hoped to return to the rejected standard in National League of Cities.
See, e.g., Kevin T. Streit, Can Congress Regulate Firearms?: Printz v. United States and the
Intersection of the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second Amendment, 7
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 645, 652 n.62 (1999) (noting that the "traditional areas of state
regulation" language in Lopez echoed National League of Cities).
156. See Stanley Fields, Student Article, Leaving Wildlife Out of National Wildlife
Refuges: The Irony of Wyoming v. United States, 44 Nat. Resources J. 1211, 1217 (2004)
("[I]n United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism require earnest analysis to ensure
that Congress does not exceed its limitations and intrude upon authority retained by states.").
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otherwise valid exercise of federal power is void under the Tenth
Amendment if it intrudes into an area of traditional state concern." 157
Although Morrison and Lopez appear to hold that it is important to keep
Congress from regulating in areas where states have traditionally been
sovereign, under Raich, the question of whether a congressional statute
intrudes into a traditional area of state concern does not appear to be
important. 158 However, Justice O'Connor's Raich dissent discusses the
Tenth Amendment at length, arguing that "Congress cannot use its authority
under the Clause to contravene the principle of state sovereignty embodied
in the Tenth Amendment," and noting that Tenth Amendment-type
concerns were alluded to in Lopez and Morrison.159 Therefore, questions
have been raised with respect to the lengths to which Congress may go in
regulating these types of traditionally state-governed areas, including
health, education, and general public welfare. 160
Before Lopez and Morrison, the line of cases upholding the Civil Rights
Act appeared to grant Congress broad power to regulate what could be
considered "social" problems. 161 Congress has used, or attempted to use,
the Commerce Clause to legislate in areas that appear to be only tenuously
connected with interstate commerce, such as racial discrimination,
environmental protection, and violence against women. 162 Over the last
fifteen years, Congress has included abortion regulation in this use of its
powers. 163 Under a theory of state sovereignty over traditional areas of
state regulation, derived from the Tenth Amendment, these regulations
could be problematic.
The next section of this Note describes the various ways in which
Congress has legislated, or has proposed to legislate, with regard to
abortion. This section describes how Congress first began to legislate in the
area of abortion with a non-Commerce Clause approach and then describes
the new direction Congress appears to be pursuing in using the Commerce
Clause to regulate abortion.
157. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 71 n.54 (citing United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 582-84 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
158. The majority in Raich rejected without discussion the respondents' argument that the
Tenth Amendment prevents the federal government from regulating in the area of health care
as a traditional area of state control. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
159. Id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2221 (arguing that the police powers of defining criminal law and "protect[ing]
the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens" have always been considered to be solely
within the purview of the states).
161. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see also VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
163. See, e.g., FACE, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(PBABA), Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III
2003)).
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1. The Commerce Clause and Abortion Regulation
a. Congress's First Attempts to Reach Abortion Using the Congressional
Spending Power
Before Roe,164 Congress had never directly regulated abortion. However,
immediately afterward, the first of a number of laws, in the guise of an
amendment to an appropriations bill, was proposed by Senator Henry Hyde
of Illinois, "limit[ing] federal funding for abortions through Medicaid and
all other HHS programs to those necessary to save a woman's life and...
in cases of rape and incest, or where the pregnancy would cause 'severe and
long-lasting physical health damage' to the woman." 165 A line of Supreme
Court cases upheld the constitutionality of federal and state statutes, as well
as executive orders and regulations, that refused to fund abortion services
for non-medically necessary abortions and prohibited government workers
from providing information or referrals regarding abortion. 166
b. Congress's New Direction: Regulating Abortion Under the Commerce
Clause
Until 1993, the only abortion regulations enacted by Congress involved
the use or withholding of federal funding, and were therefore enacted under
the congressional Spending Power. 16 7 These bills were also generally
introduced by Republican Congress members.168 However, in 1993, after
many investigative hearings, pro-choice members of Congress found that
there was an ongoing concerted national effort to protest, accost, and
otherwise prevent patients from accessing abortion clinics, sometimes
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, A Timeline of Supreme Court Decisions Protecting Privacy,
http://www.crlp.org/crt-roejtimeline.html (last visited July 23, 2006).
166. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
167. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 1. Generally, the spending power has been construed to
allow Congress to appropriate funds for whatever purpose it chooses and to restrict both the
use of the funds and to some extent the activities of the states or parties receiving the funds.
See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) ("Congress has authority under
the Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies to promote the general welfare, and it has
corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer
dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare."); Rust, 500
U.S. at 177 (upholding a statute which prohibited recipients of Title X funding, doctors and
health clinics, from counseling patients about abortion, as a valid use of the spending
power); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that it was constitutional
for Congress to condition the receipt of federal highway funds on the state-recipient's
passing a law raising the minimum age for alcohol purchase to twenty-one years of age).
168. See Alison Mitchell, Senate Votes to Ban a Controversial Abortion Procedure, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 1999, at A20.
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leading to violence and often to the closure of the clinics. 169 In response,
Congress passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE).170
Rather than regulate abortion, FACE regulated the actions of protestors
outside abortion clinics and reproductive health facilities, and was intended
to protect clinics that the states were unable or unwilling to protect.' 71
Two years earlier, Democrats in Congress had proposed the Freedom of
Choice Act (FOCA), and in 1993 they introduced it again.' 72 FOCA was
also based on Congress's Commerce power and was intended to preserve
the original holding of Roe, specifically that states could not interfere with a
woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy before viability, 173 at a time when
many in Congress believed that the Court was close to overruling the
case. 174 Although the bill originally garnered a great deal of support and
attention, the election of William J. Clinton in 1992 as well as a backlash
from conservative politicians in Washington shifted the focus away from
protecting the right to abortion toward widening access to reproductive
health services. 175 FOCA was reintroduced in 1995 but failed to garner any
169. See Providing for Consideration of S. 636, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act of 1993, and Motion to Substitute H.R. 796, 140 Cong. Rec. H 1498 (1994) (statement of
Rep. Charles Schumer).
170. FACE, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000)).
Among other purposes, the Act was intended to
promote the public safety and health activities affecting interstate commerce by
establishing federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent,
threatening and destructive conduct intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with
a person seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services.
Id. FACE subjects violators to civil and criminal activities when they do the following:
(a) Prohibited activities. Whoever (1) by force or threat of force or by physical
obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to
injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been,
or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons
from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services; (2) by force or threat of
force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with
or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully exercising or
seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of
religious worship; or (3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a
facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health
services, or intentionally damages or destroys the property of a place of religious
worship ....
Id.
171. See 140 Cong. Rec. H1498 (1994) (statement of Rep. Charles Schumer).
172. See Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA), S. 25, H.R. 25, 102d Cong. (1991); FOCA, S.
25, H.R. 1068, 103d Cong. (1993).
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
174. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), affirming the central holding in Roe. However,
the Casey Court allowed many new restrictions on abortion services to remain in place. Id.
Consequently, many activists and members of Congress were concerned that the broad
fundamental right recognized in Roe was being chipped away and wanted to ensure that, no
matter the composition of the Court, the right to choose would remain. See Gloria Feldt,
Twenty Years Later Future Is Up to Voters, Ariz. Republic/Gazette, Jan. 24, 1993, at C5.
175. Kevin Merida, Abortion Bill Overtaken by Health Reform; Rights Groups Focus on
Ensuring Access, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1994, at Al.
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serious attention. 176 In 2006, FOCA was again reintroduced, and currently
has eleven co-sponsors in the Senate and fifty-five co-sponsors in the
House. 177 FOCA is attracting new attention as it has become clear that Roe
is in jeopardy, due to the appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, as well as a law passed in South
Dakota outlawing abortion that is intended to provoke a court battle to
challenge Roe. 17
8
Both FACE and FOCA were legislative initiatives pushed by Democrats
and pro-choice advocacy groups. In contrast, between 1993 and 2003, the
most significant piece of abortion legislation on the Republican and
conservative agenda was the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(PBABA). 179 The PBABA was introduced and passed by Congress in
1995, 1997, 2000, and 2003.180 On each of the first three occasions,
President Clinton vetoed the Act because it lacked a health exception. 181 In
176. FOCA, H.R. 776, 104th Cong. (1995). FOCA was also introduced in 2004 and
gained slightly more support. FOCA, S. 2020, H.R. 3719, 108th Cong. (2004).
177. FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151, 109th Cong. (2006).
178. Jeremy Alford, Louisiana Governor Plans to Sign Anti-abortion Law, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 2006, at Al 8; Douglas McCollam, Can "Roe" Survive the Arrival of Alito?, Legal
Times, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id = 1133863511391.
179. See David Firestone & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Majority Starts a Step Behind, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 2003, at A17; Todd S. Purdum, Elizabeth Dole Is Shunning 'Dead End'
Abortion Fight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1999, at A10. Currently, there are two other pieces of
legislation dealing with abortion that have been proposed by conservatives and are being
considered by Congress. The first, the Child Custody Protection Act as it is known in the
Senate (also known, with some major differences, as the Child Interstate Abortion
Notification Act in the House), would make it a federal crime to "transport a minor" across
state lines in order to help the minor seek out an abortion in a state that does not require
parental consent, if her home state requires such consent. Child Custody Protection Act, S.
396, 109th Cong. (2005); Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, H.R. 748, 109th Cong.
(2005). This proposed law suffers from a variety of constitutional infirmities, which are
beyond the scope of this Note. See Joanna S. Liebman, Note, The Underage, the "Unborn, "
and the Unconstitutional: An Analysis of the Child Custody Protection Act, 11 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 407 (2003). The second piece of legislation is the Parental Notification and
Intervention Act of 2005, which proposes a national parental consent law. H.R. 2971, 109th
Cong. (2005). This bill has no jurisdictional element, findings, or apparent connection to
interstate commerce, nor does it mention the Commerce Clause as its locus of authority. Id.
While all of those features might raise significant issues under a Lopez or possibly even
Raich view, since this legislation is in the very early stages of discussion in Congress, this
Note does not speculate further about its constitutionality.
180. PBABA, S. 939, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995); PBABA, S. 6, H.R. 1122, 105th
Cong. (1997); PBABA, S. 1692, H.R. 3660, 107th Cong. (2000); PBABA, Pub. L. No. 108-
105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003)).
181. Brian Knowlton, Gay and Abortion Rulings Underscore Stakes of Presidential Race,
Int'l Herald Trib., June 30, 2000, at 3. In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the
Supreme Court struck down a state "partial-birth" abortion ban that was almost identical to
the one passed in 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2003. See id. at 929-30. The state statute also
banned so-called "partial-birth" abortions and contained an exception in cases where it is
necessary to save the life of the mother. Id. at 921. However, the law did not provide an
exception for cases in which it is necessary to save the health of the mother, and the Supreme
Court held that this was an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy. Id. at 929-30.
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2003, President Bush signed the Act into law. 182 The PBABA, like FACE
and FOCA, grounds congressional authority in the Commerce Clause, by
stating that the law applies to doctors who perform abortions "in or
affecting interstate ... commerce." 183
Beyond the statutes already proposed or passed, other possibilities exist
should Roe be overturned. Congress could propose a ban on abortion
nationwide, or pass other restrictions on abortion provisions such as
parental involvement statutes or national waiting periods. 184
E. Multiple Methodologies
The question of whether abortion can be regulated is not as
straightforward as it may first appear. Just as guns can be regulated in a
variety of ways that may or may not be allowed under the Commerce
Clause, 185 abortion can also be regulated in a variety of ways. The
constitutionality of federal laws regulating abortion may depend upon
whether Congress attempts to regulate the procedures for providing
abortions, access to abortion services, or the type of person who is able to
provide or receive abortions. Whether Congress can regulate abortion in
any particular way will depend on how a court analyzes any law in light of
Commerce Clause precedent.186
As discussed above, the Court in Lopez identified three categories of
activity that can be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 187
While it appears to be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the rationales
of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, Raich claimed to adhere to these three
categories of regulable activity and thus any inquiry about abortion must
182. PBABA, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp.
III 2003)); Richard Stevenson, Bush Signs Ban on a Procedure for Abortions, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 6, 2003, at Al. Although Stenberg is still good law, congressional supporters of the
PBABA argued that the Court's finding that the procedure may be necessary in some cases
to save the health of the mother was inaccurate and urged that Congress need not adhere to
it. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934; Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting congressional findings from the PBABA as saying that a "moral, medical, and
ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion... is a
gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be
prohibited").
183. PBABA, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003).
184. McCollam, supra note 178 (noting that if Roe were overturned, "[i]t is... possible
that Congress could set a national abortion policy, as legislators did on a smaller scale when
they banned so-called 'partial-birth' abortion in 2003"); see also Rosen, supra note 5, at 65
(theorizing that if Roe were overturned, there would be a group of hard-line conservative
senators who would likely introduce some kind of "draconian abortion ban," and discussing
the likelihood, or unlikelihood, of such a ban reaching the Senate floor).
185. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a statute
regulating simple possession of a handgun within a school zone is unconstitutional), with
United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that regulating simple
possession of machine guns is constitutional because the regulation was part of a broader
scheme regulating machine guns).
186. See Law, supra note 7, at 409-17.
187. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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still be conducted within this framework. If abortion or abortion services
are to be regulated under the Commerce Clause, they would have to be
understood to fit within one of the last two categories, as "commerce" that
can be regulated "even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities" 188 or as activities that can be regulated even though they are not
themselves interstate commerce because they have "a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." 189 Lopez laid out important factors that should be
present for something to be regulable under the third category: There
should be a jurisdictional element, making it clear to courts how to
determine whether a particular action falls within the statute by laying out
the necessary connection between the item regulated and interstate
commerce (i.e., that a gun has traveled in interstate commerce);
congressional findings as to how the activity affects interstate commerce are
helpful, especially when "no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked
eye"; 190 the activity itself must be economic in nature; and the regulation
should be part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for which regulating
this particular intrastate activity is necessary to make the scheme
workable.191
In Morrison, the Court added to these considerations what was later
termed the "non-infinity" principle 192 and then clarified the concept-that
the link between the activity and commerce must not be too "attenuated."' 193
Together, Lopez and Morrison can be read to present a heavy burden for
Congress to meet in order to regulate intrastate activity. These decisions
also appear to call into question a number of decisions made by the Court
after the New Deal where the Court had deferred to congressional findings
and intent.194
In Raich, the Court backed away from the Lopez and Morrison factors.
While maintaining that Lopez and Morrison were still good law, the Court
emphasized that Lopez and Morrison must be read in context with all the
post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 195 The Raich Court gave
188. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
189. Id. at 559.
190. Id. at 563.
191. See id. at 559-68.
192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
193. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-14 (2000). For example, in Morrison,
the Court found that the connection between commerce and violence against women was too
"attenuated." Id. at 615.
194. The categories and requirements laid out in Lopez and Morrison were not discussed
in earlier Commerce Clause cases, and in fact, earlier cases were based on an understanding
of the Commerce Clause which now seems in doubt. For example, the Court's decision in
Katzenbach v. McClung held that "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964). For
further discussion of the economic/noneconomic distinctions between the post-New Deal
Commerce Clause cases and the post-Lopez Commerce Clause cases, see supra note 132 and
the accompanying text.
195. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
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great deference to Congress, holding that Congress need have only a
rational basis for believing that an activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and noting that in cases where the activity is
"economic," 196 no particularized findings are necessary. Justice Scalia's
Raich concurrence went further, stating that the regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity is also constitutional if the activity is reached as part of a
broader regulatory scheme.197
Essentially, the conclusion a court reaches will be guided by whether it
adopts a Lopez/Morrison or Raich methodology. Abortion appears to fall
within the categories mentioned in Justice Kennedy's Lopez concurrence
and Justice O'Connor's Raich dissent in that it has traditionally been
regulated by the states, not by the federal government, 198 both because it is
a part of the practice of medicine and because it is a social issue often
thought best left to the states. 199 In addition, the question of whether an
abortion procedure itself is commerce has yet to be entirely settled:
although some circuit courts have concluded that abortion is commerce, 20 0
dissenting judges on these circuits have disagreed, 20 1 and the Supreme
Court has never addressed this issue. Depending on how a court wanted to
address the question of "economic" activity, the choice to perform an
abortion or to dispense a particular drug that will cause an abortion may not
be an economic decision, even though there are economic effects. Even the
fact that an abortion generally has to be paid for is not necessarily
conclusive; as Justice Stevens pointed out in Lopez, a gun, too, at some
point must have been bought and sold in order to end up in someone's
hands near a school,202 but that was not enough for the majority in Lopez.20 3
After Lopez and Morrison, the lack of clarity around the Commerce
Clause led a number of commentators to propose their own solutions.
Some commentators believe that Lopez and Morrison signaled a willingness
to return to the strict analysis of the pre-New Deal era and actively
supported such a move.204 Other commentators, including Justice Breyer,
seem to believe that a new kind of "hard look" or "clear statement" test
would have better results, whereby the Court could essentially ask Congress
for a clearly explained, well-thought-out justification for legislation, and in
return, the Court would give that explanation due deference. 20 5 Still other
196. Id. at 2211 (noting that "'[e]conomics' refers to the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities" (internal quotations omitted), as defined in a dictionary
published in 1966).
197. Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
198. See supra notes 91-95, 145-47 and accompanying text; see also infra note 326 and
accompanying text (discussing early state and federal abortion laws).
199. See supra notes 91-95, 146 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 285-96 and accompanying text.
202. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 565.
204. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 70, at 113-14; Barnett, supra note 68, at 146.
205. See Breyer, supra note 82, at 65 (arguing that these types of doctrines would
"require Congress to look hard at and speak clearly on a matter, but they rarely would create
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commentators advocate a complete return to the more plenary view of the
post-New Deal era.206 Two others, commentators Robert Pushaw and
Grant Nelson, have suggested a test they have dubbed "neo-federalism,"
which involves a two-part test: First, the activity must be "commerce,"
meaning "the voluntary sale of property or services and all accompanying
activities intended for the marketplace"; and "[s]econd, the commerce
regulated must be 'among the several states,"' meaning commerce between
two or more states or commerce occurring in one state but affecting
others.20 7 One thing all the commentators seemed to agree upon even
before Raich is that the Court has entered an area that had been considered
clear, albeit one in which little judicial review seemed to take place, and has
made it cloudy.20 8 Without a clear indication from the Court about how it
intends to proceed, lower courts will have a great deal of leeway to make
these kinds of important decisions.
Ultimately, it could be that a court viewing abortion through the
Lopez/Morrison lens would find that this was not an area that Congress
could legitimately reach, because it is an area traditionally regulated by
states and because an abortion is not necessarily an "economic activity,"
whereas a Court viewing abortion through a Raich lens would probably
disagree, because congressional decision making and findings would be
given deference and because abortion would probably be found to have an
effect on commerce even if it were not commerce itself. However, the lines
are not fixed, and since the guidance from the Court is so nebulous, it is
possible that a court applying either theory could find abortion regulable or
non-regulable, depending on which elements of either methodology they
utilized, and on how the statute was drafted. In predicting how a court
would resolve these issues, a primary consideration will be the court's
attitude toward federalism, respect for traditional areas of state sovereignty,
and deference for the political process. 209
an absolute 'federalism-based' bar to legislation"); Killenbeck, supra note 81, at 49 (arguing
for a new standard that "resembles but does not mirror the 'hard look' approach taken by the
Court... in particular in certain administrative law matters ... it is a standard Congress
itself has imposed on executive agencies, where, for example, it believes it necessary to
guarantee that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of
proposed federal action" (internal quotations omitted)).
206. See Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v.
Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 727, 735 (2005); Law, supra note 7, at 396.
207. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 345-46; see also Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause
Standard for the New Millennium: "Yes" to Broad Congressional Control over Commercial
Transactions; "No" to Federal Legislation on Social and Cultural Issues, 55 Ark. L. Rev.
1213, 1215-18 (2003).
208. See Killenbeck, supra note 81, at 58.
209. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 104, at 1253, 1263 (discussing the lower courts'
responses to Lopez and Morrison, and noting that the courts for the most part have tended to
limit those cases to their facts rather than follow them to their logical conclusions); see also
Pushaw, supra note 26, at 321 ("[C]urrent Commerce Clause jurisprudence depends largely
on federal judges' instinctive assessments about whether a particular activity is
'commercial,' affects interstate commerce 'substantially,' or trenches upon a matter of
historical state control.").
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Part II of this Note discusses the different ways in which courts could
apply Lopez, Morrison, and Raich to congressional legislation regulating
abortion. Part II first lays out the variety of ways in which Congress could
or has regulated abortion. It then discusses the different considerations
presented by each of the three cases and describes how a lower court could
choose to follow either the Lopez/Morrison type of analysis or the Raich
type of analysis to reach differing conclusions on the constitutionality of
legislation. Following that overview, Part II explores in detail the two
different approaches, Lopez/Morrison and Raich, and the potential results if
those approaches were to be applied to federal abortion laws, both those
expanding and restricting access to abortion.
II. DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO REGULATE ABORTION UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE?
The recent Commerce Clause cases present Congress with a challenge:
will the laws it passes with the Commerce power be upheld as valid or
struck down as overreaching? The restrictions that Lopez seemed to place
upon congressional authority angered many Congress members who believe
that Congress, and not the Court, has the power to determine how to use the
Commerce and other constitutionally granted powers. 210 After Raich, it is
possible that the concerns raised by Congress members will be
alleviated. 211 However, it is not clear whether Raich is truly the last word
in this debate because of the Court's assertion that both Lopez and Morrison
remain good law;212 in the meantime, Congress has continued to pass and
consider legislation based on the Commerce power, including regulations
dealing with abortion.213 Since the Court left both Lopez and Morrison
intact and yet reached what appears to be a contradictory opinion in Raich,
210. Congressional response to the Supreme Court's "new" Commerce Clause
jurisprudence became very clear during the confirmation hearings of Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. During both sets of hearings, several senators commented
about their disagreement with the restriction of congressional power resulting from these
decisions and asked then-nominees Roberts and Alito whether they also believed that the
Commerce power was thus limited. See Linda Greenhouse, Judge Roberts, the Committee Is
Interested in Your View on.... N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al (quoting from a letter
written by Sen. Arlen Specter, Republican from Pennsylvania, to then-Supreme Court
nominee Judge Roberts stating that many in Congress "are irate about the court's denigrating
and, really, disrespectful statements about Congress's competence" in Lopez and Morrison);
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 277 (2006) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (stating in her opening remarks that "I have very deep concern about the legacy of
the Rehnquist court and its efforts to restrict congressional authority to enact legislation by
adopting a very narrow view of several provisions of the Constitution, including the
Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment").
211. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
212. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209-11 (2005).
213. See supra notes 170, 176, 183 and accompanying text.
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without further guidance lower courts will likely be able to support
conclusions relying on any or all of the cases.2 14
The next two sections of this Note explore what would happen to federal
abortion laws if lower courts chose to follow the deferential logic of Raich,
or determined that, since Raich left Lopez and Morrison intact, those cases
provide more important guidance in Commerce Clause cases. The first
section discusses how a lower court might find that most congressional
abortion laws would be legitimate after Raich, and the second section
discusses how it is equally plausible that lower courts would find that
federal abortion laws were overreaching by Congress.
A. After Raich, It Is Possible that Congress Could Widely Regulate
Abortion
Congress could choose to regulate abortion in a number of different
ways, either by passing laws intended to expand access and ensure its
legality nationwide, or to restrict access, or possibly even trying to ban it
altogether if Roe were overturned. With any such legislation, there would
be a question about whether the statute would be upheld as a constitutional
exercise of the Commerce power, or struck down as an overreaching of
Congress's power.
There are two current examples of legislation intended to expand access
to abortion. The proposed FOCA 215 purports to ensure access to abortion
by making it illegal for states to ban abortion before viability, or after
viability in cases where necessary to save the life or health of the mother.2 16
FOCA would roll back the restrictions that many states have put in place
since Planned Parenthood v. Casey, such as waiting periods, parental
consent laws, and "informed consent" laws; if Roe were overturned, FOCA
would ensure that the right to abortion was still protected. FACE, passed in
1994, is intended to ensure access to abortion by making it illegal to prevent
214. See Pushaw, supra note 18, at 884 ("Just as many scholars prematurely heralded
Lopez as the beginning of a Commerce Clause revolution, others now may be too quick to
characterize Raich as the end." (footnote omitted)); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 48, at
932-33.
215. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
216. FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151, 109th Cong. (2006). The prohibitions in section 4 of the
Act read as follows:
(b) Prohibition of Interference-A government may not-
(1) deny or interfere with a woman's right to choose-
(A) to bear a child;
(B) to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability; or
(C) to terminate a pregnancy after viability where termination is
necessary to protect the life or health of the woman; or
(2) discriminate against the exercise of the rights set forth in paragraph (1) in
the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities, services, or information.
(c) Civil Action-An individual aggrieved by a violation of this section may
obtain appropriate relief (including relief against a government) in a civil action.
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patients or staff from entering clinics where reproductive health services are
provided, or to damage those clinics.217
As for legislation restricting or banning abortion, there is an important
constitutional consideration: Roe v. Wade,218 as modified by Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,219 protects the right of
women to obtain abortions until viability without an undue burden placed
on that right by the government; therefore, it is unconstitutional for
Congress to enact a country-wide ban. However, Congress has passed one
piece of legislation that has banned certain abortion procedures, specifically
so-called "partial-birth" abortion.220  Presumably, if the PBABA is
constitutional, Congress has the ability to regulate other abortion
procedures as well, or, in the absence of constitutional protections for
abortion rights, to ban it altogether.
1. Expanding and Protecting Access to Abortion
A court might approach the question of the Commerce Clause's range by
concluding that Raich was the most relevant precedent and that Morrison
and Lopez had been, as Justice O'Connor suggested in the Raich dissent,
mere "drafting guides" for a Congress that needed a reminder of its
limitations. 221  From that perspective, the inquiry shifts slightly but
significantly, away from the legitimacy of the jurisdictional elements and
findings and toward whether Congress could have rationally concluded that
the activity being regulated substantially affects interstate commerce, and
possibly to some extent whether the activity is economic or is part of a
larger regulatory package. 222  Any regulation by Congress seeking to
expand access to a particular kind of paid-for service would seem to fulfill
these basic requirements, especially if Congress makes findings indicating
that the practice has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
following section will discuss the decisions upholding FACE, as a prime
example of how the Raich perspective would probably find abortion
regulation to be constitutional.
217. FACE, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000). See supra note 170 for relevant statutory language.
218. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
219. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
220. PBABA, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003). There is no specific procedure called
"partial-birth" abortion; the term was created by Republican activists to refer to a procedure
sometimes known to doctors as "intact dilation and extraction." Cynthia Gorney, Gambling
with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything to Lose, Harpers, Nov. 1, 2004,
at 33, available at http://www.harpers.org/GamblingWithAbortion.html. For a brief
discussion of other proposed legislation which attempts to limit access to abortion, see supra
note 183.
221. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2205-15.
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a. The Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act, Upheld as
Constitutional
Because FACE has been challenged and upheld so many times, 223 it
provides ample evidence of how a court could uphold an abortion-related
statute, especially after Raich. As of 2005, eight circuit courts have upheld
FACE on the grounds that abortion services substantially affect interstate
commerce and therefore that obstructing the entrance to a clinic is an
obstruction of commerce that can be reached under the Commerce
power.224 These circuits appear to be employing a Raich-like methodology,
which tends to lead to the conclusion that Congress can ensure access to
abortion in a number of different ways.
All of the cases in which FACE has been challenged arose under
circumstances in which protestors were accused of physically obstructing
abortion services facilities. 225 For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld
FACE in United States v. Wilson, where protestors were charged with
violating FACE by blockading the Wisconsin Women's Health Care Center
by welding themselves into cars and then wedging those cars into the
clinic's doors. 226
Before Lopez was decided, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Act because
"interstate commerce was threatened" by the fact that the protestors were
obstructing clinics that employed at least some doctors who had practices in
multiple states, purchased medical supplies and office supplies that move in
interstate commerce, and attracted a clientele from multiple states. 227 Even
after Lopez and Morrison, every circuit to address FACE has upheld it.22 8
The courts have emphasized, despite strong dissents, that their role is to
"decide whether a rational basis exists for concluding that [the] regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce" and have held that such a
basis exists.22 9 For example, in United States v. Gregg, the Third Circuit
found that, unlike the gender-motivated crimes targeted by the statute struck
down in Morrison, "the activity regulated by FACE... is activity with an
223. See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005); Norton v. Ashcroft,
298 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000); United
States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir.
1997); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412
(D.C. Cir. 1996); United States. v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413 (1 1th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir.
1995).
224. See supra note 223.
225. See, e.g., Wilson, 73 F.3d 675; United States v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 111 F. Supp.
2d 948 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
226. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 677.
227. Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995).
228. See Saylor, supra note 31, at 112; see also supra note 224.
229. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680; see also Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir
1995) (upholding FACE because "the provision of reproductive health services" is
"commercial activity," and because there is an interstate market for these services, and
clinics "receive supplies through interstate commerce").
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effect that is economic in nature. '230 Gregg held that Congress "had a
rational basis upon which to conclude that the activities governed by FACE
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce," based on extensive
findings showing that "a national market for abortion-related services
exists... and that reproductive health clinics are directly engaged in
interstate commerce." 231
It seems that the courts upholding FACE were almost prescient in
predicting that the Supreme Court really did intend to give deference to
Congress's rational basis, as the Supreme Court ultimately did in Raich.232
These courts have even seemed to go beyond Raich, relying heavily on the
line of cases starting with Heart of Atlanta Motel,233 which all focus on the
fact that interstate commerce is affected when private parties obstruct or fail
to serve those engaged in commerce, essentially accepting that as long as
there is an economic effect it does not matter if the activity itself is
economic.234  One commentator pointed out that the Gregg Court
recognized the similarity between FACE and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel because the discrimination targeted by the
Civil Rights Act similarly resulted in fewer customers or fewer people
being able to participate in commerce. 235
Circuit courts upholding FACE have focused on the economic nature of
the activity being protected. 236 Since Lopez and later Morrison emphasized
that the reason the two laws were struck down was because they both
regulated "non-economic" activity, courts defending FACE had to hold that
even though the activity being regulated-protesting at clinics-is not
inherently economic, the fact that the activity was aimed at preventing or
threatening commerce made the statute sufficiently related to "economic
activity" to fall within Congress's power.237 Before Morrison was decided,
one commentator noted that "FACE has a stronger commercial flavor than
does VAWA" and thus surmised that it was likely that even if VAWA was
struck down, FACE would continue to be upheld.238 A court following
Raich would likely agree with this commentator, but there are still some
lingering questions. As mentioned earlier, while the New Deal decisions
230. United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). In Gregg, the United
States sought a permanent injunction and damages against a group of thirty people who
"were an ongoing threat" to a clinic in Englewood, New Jersey. Id. at 256.
231. Id. at 263.
232. See supra notes 107, 130 and accompanying text (discussing the dissents in Lopez
and Morrison, and majority opinion in Raich).
233. 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
234. See, e.g., Gregg, 226 F.3d at 270; United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d
Cir. 1998); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C, Cir. 1996); United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Nicole Huberford, Note, The
Commerce Clause Post-Lopez: It's Not Dead Yet, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 182 (1997); supra
note 132.
235. Saylor, supra note 31, at 115.
236. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
238. Huberford, supra note 234, at 205.
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and those afterward focused on the effect of the activity to be regulated,
Raich, like Lopez and Morrison, remained focused on the nature of the
activity to be regulated. 239 Though Raich defines "economic" very broadly,
it is still possible to view criminal activity obstructing commerce as
noneconomic itself. However, if Raich indicated the beginning of a return
to the post-New Deal jurisprudence, then the fact that the activity has a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce will be sufficient for
Congress to be able to regulate it, despite the fact that the regulated activity
itself does not appear to be economic.
b. The Freedom of Choice Act, Other Protections for Abortion Rights, and
Raich
FOCA, the proposed legislation intended to ensure the legality of
abortion nationwide, provides a concrete example of how an Act expanding
or protecting access to abortion services could be crafted.240 FOCA
contains findings indicating that reproductive health services are commonly
sought by women who travel from state to state to obtain them, and are
provided by physicians and staff who travel from state to state in order to
provide them.24 1 In the same way that the Civil Rights Act addresses the
way that discrimination limits commerce by making it illegal to
discriminate if a business engages in interstate commerce, 242 FOCA seeks
to end the prohibition of particular kinds of abortion or abortion services by
making it illegal to ban that kind of activity because those bans limit
commerce in abortion services. Based on the holdings of the circuit courts
with reference to FACE, it seems that under a Raich perspective, courts
would hold that Congress could rationally conclude that "purely local
activities" such as the provision of abortions in one state, are part of a class
of economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
when aggregated. 243 In addition, as these courts have recognized, 244 there
is a similarity to the Civil Rights Act's attempt to stop racial discrimination
239. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198 (2005).
240. See supra notes 172-77, 215 and accompanying text.
241. See FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
242. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
243. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205. The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates that there
are approximately 1.4 million abortions performed in the United States each year. Stanley K.
Henshaw, Susheela Singh & Taylor Haas, The Incidence of Abortion Worldwide, 25 Fam.
Plan. Persp. Supp. S30, S34 (1999), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ournals/25s3099.html. If one state limited abortion only to
the first three months, for example, the effect on interstate commerce, as seen by women
from that state going to other states to obtain abortions, would be substantial. See Lilo T.
Strauss et al., Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Abortion
Surveillance-United States, 2001, Surveillance Summaries, Nov. 26, 2004, at 31, available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5309.pdf. According to a report published by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 88.1% of abortions occur in the first trimester.
Id. at 5.
244. See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
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from impacting interstate commerce and FOCA and FACE's attempt to
stop states and private persons from keeping women from obtaining
abortions. One commentator noted that "the movement of women between
states in order to obtain legal and safe abortions constitutes interstate
commerce [and] burden[s] placed on these women become[] a burden on
interstate commerce. '245 That same commentator, writing before Lopez
and Morrison, theorized that FOCA would be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause because of the great deference given to legislative
findings about "burdens on what [Congress itself] defines as interstate
commerce." 246  While that might not be so under a Lopez/Morrison
analysis, Raich seems to revive that deference, and therefore FOCA would
probably be considered constitutional under a Raich analysis.
Under a Raich analysis, with the deference to congressional findings and
intent and broader definition of economic activity, seemingly most attempts
by Congress to ensure or increase access to reproductive health services
would therefore be constitutional. The next section discusses how a Raich
analysis might similarly find that efforts of Congress to restrict access to
abortion were constitutional as well.
2. Restricting or Banning Abortion
A Raich approach to the Commerce Clause would probably permit
Congress to regulate abortion activity in opposing ways: While this
approach may let Congress expand access to abortion, it may also allow
Congress to restrict it. The limitation under this view, again, is whether
Congress could have rationally concluded that the activity being regulated
substantially affects interstate commerce and, to some extent, whether the
activity is economic. In Raich, the Court was influenced by the long history
and complex legislative decision making involved in the CSA.24 7 The CSA
intentionally reached intrastate possession of marijuana because Congress
had made a determination that marijuana was essentially a "bad" drug with
no useful medical purpose, and that therefore its use or sale should be
prevented in the United States except in certain carefully controlled
experiments. 248 The Court deferred absolutely to this legislative decision,
despite recognizing that Congress's determination was wrong or, at best,
faulty. 249 The decision to ban a particular drug that has recreational and
possible medical uses does not appear to be significantly different from
banning a particular procedure: Both bans take power away from
individual doctors, who are generally permitted to decide which drugs to
245. Peggy S. McClard, The Freedom of Choice Act: Will the Constitution Allow It?, 30
Hous. L. Rev. 2041, 2062-63 (1994).
246. Id. at 2063.
247. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-09.
248. See id. at 2210-13.
249. See id. at 2212 n.37; see also supra note 128.
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prescribe and which procedures to use, and away from states, which are
generally able to decide how to regulate the practice of medicine.
250
a. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and Raich
While Congress can ban drugs with its Commerce power, Congress can
not simply ban abortion with its Commerce power--constitutional
protections prevent an abortion ban structured the same way as the CSA.2
51
The CSA regulates numerous drugs, many if not most of which travel
across states lines in interstate commerce and is therefore a "broad
regulatory scheme" that reaches both inter- and intrastate activity.252 The
PBABA, on the other hand, regulates a single form of abortion, and its
connection to interstate commerce is more attenuated than the sale of a
particular commodity which is usually sold on the market. 253 In contrast to
a saleable good in the stream of commerce, a so-called "partial-birth"
abortion is never sold from one state to another and can never itself travel
between states.254
However, at least one commentator has argued that the PBABA is a
constitutional use of the Commerce Clause because "[p]artial birth abortion
falls squarely within the ... definition of 'commerce'; 25 5 thus courts
would sustain the PBABA on Commerce Clause grounds because so-called
"partial-birth" abortions are "'commerce'-the voluntary [sale] of a service
... in a market-based enterprise" that has an effect "'among the states."' 256
Although the PBABA does not have findings, 257 the reasoning that so-
called "partial-birth" abortions can be considered commerce is based on the
fact that when women and physicians travel from state to state specifically
250. See Kreit & Marcus, supra note 116, at 965-88 (discussing extensively the history of
state involvement in the regulation of medicine).
251. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
252. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-05.
253. Id. at 2208-10 (discussing how the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) regulates both
the legal and illegal markets for drugs, including marijuana).
254. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 87.
255. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 349.
256. Id. at319.
257. While the PBABA lacked findings on the connection between so-called "partial-
birth" abortions and interstate commerce, the Act was accompanied by many findings on the
morality of the procedure itself. See id. at 325. However, the motivation behind the Act does
not limit Congress's ability to use its Commerce power to reach this activity, as Congress's
power to reach activity for any purpose, moral or otherwise, so long as the power is derived
from the Constitution, has been affirmed by the Court. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also
United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding FACE, noting that
"Congress can regulate interstate commerce for any lawful motive"). As the cases after the
Civil Rights Act demonstrated, the appropriate inquiry is whether the regulated activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, not why the Congress wants to reach that activity
in the first place.
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to obtain or provide this procedure, they are engaging in commerce that has
an effect on the interstate market.258
Under a Raich analysis, with its great deference to Congress, these
arguments might be sufficient to uphold the PBABA against a Commerce
Clause challenge. However, while the more plenary view of the Commerce
Clause may not prevent Congress from banning particular abortion
procedures, the PBABA itself may suffer from fatal drafting flaws since its
jurisdictional element does not seem possible to apply. 259
b. Further Congressional Efforts to Restrict Abortion and Raich
If Roe were overturned, a Raich analysis might find that an all-out ban on
abortion is constitutional. In the post-New Deal, pre-Lopez era, Congress
passed a number of bans on activities that were not necessarily commercial
but that Congress believed were sufficiently immoral or dangerous to be
banned throughout the country instead of leaving the decision to the
states.260 For example, Congress has at various times banned the shipping
of lottery tickets between states, prohibited transporting women across state
lines for immoral purposes, and prohibited the sale of machine guns to
individuals across the country. 261 These Acts have been upheld by Courts in
the face of Commerce Clause challenges, and under a Raich view would
probably continue to be upheld. 262 Similarly, if Congress could rationally
conclude that an entire kind of activity should be prohibited, such as the
manufacture and possession of medical marijuana,263 then in a world
without Roe, Congress may be able to conclude that abortion should also be
banned.
258. See John Leland, Inside an Abortion Clinic: Under Din of Abortion Debate, an
Experience Shared Quietly, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2005, at Al ("A late-term procedure
called intact dilation and extraction, sometimes known as partial-birth abortion, accounted
for less than two-tenths of 1 percent of all abortions in 2000, according to the Guttmacher
Institute. Fewer than one in 50 providers performed those."); Tamar Lewin, Study on a Late
Term Abortion Finds Procedure Is Little Used, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1998, at A12 (noting
that in 1998, there were only fourteen hospitals or clinics that performed late-term abortions
using the intact dilation and extraction procedure, meaning that women who need such
abortions must go to one of these fourteen locations).
259. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2000)) (making illegal the transportation
across state lines of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose"); Assault Weapons Ban, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)-(31),
922(v)-(w) (2000) (repealed 2004) (prohibiting the manufacture, transfer, or possession of a
semiautomatic assault weapon).
261. See supra notes 259-60.
262. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 482-83 (1917) (upholding the
Mann Act as constitutional under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Frandyn, 157
F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that regulating simple possession of machine guns is
constitutional because the regulation was part of a broader scheme regulating machine guns);
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (1996) (upholding a conviction for selling a machine
gun and rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the underlying law).
263. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2203, 2207-10 (2005).
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As has been discussed in this section, under a Raich-type analysis, many
if not all congressional acts intended either to expand or restrict access to
abortion would likely be upheld as constitutional. The following section
discusses how a court using a Lopez/Morrison analysis might reach
different and even contradictory conclusions, based on the stricter elements
of that analysis and apparent lack of deference to congressional findings. 264
B. With Lopez and Morrison Still Good Law, a Court Could Find that
Congress Does Not Have the Power to Reach Abortion
Just as it would be possible for a court to broadly interpret Raich and
decide that Lopez and Morrison were essentially aberrations in the history
of the Commerce Clause, 265 it would be equally possible for a lower court
to rely on the parts of Raich that emphasize that Lopez and Morrison are
still good law, and to use the framework of those cases to address the issue
before the court in a specific case. Commentators have pointed out that,
just as Lopez and Morrison created standards that courts have found
difficult to apply,266 Raich does not fully clarify the Court's standards,
leaving Lopez/Morrison as viable analyses.267 Therefore, a lower court
could decide that Raich does not apply in a particular circumstance, perhaps
in a situation where the law before the court is not part of a broad regulatory
scheme,268 and could instead follow Lopez and Morrison. As mentioned
earlier, a court following the Lopez and Morrison line would focus on the
importance of traditional areas of state regulation and the importance of a
strong connection between the activity regulated and interstate commerce,
and could find that certain abortion statutes, or in fact all abortion laws, go
beyond Congress's enumerated powers. 269  A court that took this
perspective would concentrate on whether legislation is within the scope of
Congress's limited and enumerated powers as granted by the
Constitution.270 This perspective would assign prime importance to the
elements identified in Lopez and Morrison: a jurisdictional element,
congressional findings, the economic nature of the activity, and the overall
264. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Lopez
and Morrison).
265. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
266. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 20, at 371.
267. See Pushaw, supra note 18, at 908 ("[I]t is premature to pronounce Raich the death
knell of [Lopez and Morrison] because of the supposed defections of Justices Scalia and
Kennedy .... [T]he majority and concurring opinions reaffirmed rather than overruled
Lopez and Morrison, and those cases invite discretionary applications of imprecise standards
on a case-by-case basis."); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 48, at 933.
268. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[The Guns-Free School Zone Act] is not an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity."); cf Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198 ("Congress clearly
acted rationally in determining that this subdivided class of activities is an essential part of
the larger regulatory scheme.").
269. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
270. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554.
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regulatory scheme. 271 Under Lopez, a court may not view abortion as an
"economic activity" and therefore would not necessarily agree that the
activity can be aggregated. 272 This question of whether abortion or the
abortion-related activity is "economic" would be the key to almost any
abortion regulation, but the answer is not necessarily clear. The next
section discusses how a court applying these elements and considering
abortion as "economic" or not "economic" would view laws intended to
expand and protect access to abortion.
1. Expanding and Protecting Access to Abortion
As mentioned above, Congress has in the past and may in the future pass
legislation intended to expand and protect access to abortion services.273
Thus far, Congress has passed FACE, prohibiting protestors from
obstructing abortion clinics, and is considering FOCA, which would
prevent states from imposing burdens upon women's ability to choose to
terminate their pregnancies. 274  This section describes how a
Lopez/Morrison court might view those Acts and other possible expansions
to reproductive healthcare and reproductive rights.
FOCA, the proposed legislation that would prevent states from
interfering with a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy before viability,
could be in a unique position in the Commerce Clause debate, since it
appears to be aimed at protecting access to a market, but lacks many of the
elements identified by the Court as important in sustaining congressional
action. First, the purpose of FOCA, to protect abortion rights and the
holding of Roe, appears to be unrelated to interstate commerce. 275 Second,
the Act lacks a jurisdictional element connected with commerce-instead,
the Act targets government action, whether over its own citizens or citizens
of other states, which raises other federalism issues aside from the
Commerce Clause dilemma.276  However, FOCA does include
congressional findings linking abortion to interstate commerce, specifically,
findings that women often cross state lines to obtain abortions and that
271. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
272. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature.").
273. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. The primary purpose of FOCA is "[t]o protect, consistent with Roe v. Wade, a
woman's freedom to choose to bear a child or terminate a pregnancy, and for other
purposes." FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151, 109th Cong. (2006).
276. See supra notes 44-46. FOCA may also implicate Tenth Amendment concerns.
Under the Lopez/Morrison view, this may be of importance, since the traditional area of state
regulation concern motivated at least two of the Justices who made up the Lopez majority.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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abortion clinics are commercial businesses.2 77 In addition, the fact that
FOCA targets a national market in abortion services could be viewed as a
broad regulatory scheme, which would mean that individual cases in which
a state tried to ban abortion only for its own citizens could be preempted by
federal legislation if viewed as essential to the broader regulatory goal.
278
In fact, FOCA has been compared by one commentator to the Pure Food
and Drug Act, which "provide[s] consumers with a uniformly safe service
throughout the nation."2 79 If a court were to agree that the provision of
abortions is "economic activity," which does not seem unlikely given that
abortions are typically paid for in the course of commercial interactions,
280
some kind of national legalization of abortion could be constitutional, even
if FOCA itself is struck down because of its purpose and the lack of a
jurisdictional element. On the other hand, some judges have held, generally
277. Among the findings in FOCA are these relevant subsections:
(13) Congress has the affirmative power under section 8 of article I of the
Constitution and section 5 of the 14th amendment to the Constitution to enact
legislation to facilitate interstate commerce and to prevent State interference with
interstate commerce, liberty, or equal protection of the laws.
(14) Federal protection of a woman's right to choose to prevent or terminate a
pregnancy falls within this affirmative power of Congress, in part, because-
(A) many women cross State lines to obtain abortions and many more
would be forced to do so absent a constitutional right or Federal
protection;
(B) reproductive health clinics are commercial actors that regularly
purchase medicine, medical equipment, and other necessary supplies
from out-of-State suppliers; and
(C) reproductive health clinics employ doctors, nurses, and other
personnel who travel across State lines in order to provide reproductive
health services to patients.
FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151 § 2.
278. See McClard, supra note 245, at 2064. In fact, FOCA has been reintroduced in 2006
partly in response to the fact that South Dakota recently passed a total ban on abortion in that
state. See Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Nadler Introduces Freedom of Choice Act
(Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ny08_nadler/
FreeofChoicAct040706.html. Rep. Jerrold Nadler issued this press release, stating, "In the
states, attacks on the right to choose have accelerated, including an outright ban in South
Dakota .... For many years, people have been saying that the pro-choice movement has
been crying wolf. Well, today, the wolf is at the door. We have to do something, and we
have to do it now." Id. Although the South Dakota ban is clearly unconstitutional under Roe,
anti-choice activists in that state are hoping to prompt a fight that will take the issue to the
Supreme Court and cause Roe to be overturned. Pro-choice congressional leaders have
responded by redoubling their efforts to get FOCA passed. See Press Release, Sen. Barbara
Boxer, Boxer Introduces Legislation to Guarantee a Woman's Right to Choose (Apr. 7,
2006), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=253685&& (issued
by Sen. Barbara Boxer upon introducing FOCA in 2006); Press Release, Rep. Christopher
Shays, As South Dakota Attacks Roe v. Wade, Shays Defends Choice (Mar. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/shays/news/2006/march/marsouthdakota.htm (issued by
Rep. Christopher Shays to protest the passage of the South Dakota ban and affirm his strong
support for abortion rights as a co-sponsor of FOCA).
279. McClard, supra note 245, at 2064.
280. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text (discussing commercial nature of
abortion services).
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in dissents, that abortion services are not "economic activity," so even that
conclusion is uncertain.281
FACE may be more difficult to uphold under the Lopez/Morrison view,
because the activities specifically regulated by the Act are similar to those
regulated by the legislation struck down in both previous cases: criminal,
noncommercial actions. 282 FACE was the first legislation passed that based
abortion-related regulation on the Commerce power.283 While the circuit
courts that addressed FACE thus far have upheld the Act, they have
generally done so using an analysis that more strongly resembles Raich than
Lopez or Morrison, and several did so despite strong dissents.284 These
dissents clearly lay out the Lopez/Morrison view and conclude that FACE
cannot be constitutional under this kind of analysis.285
In Gregg, the Third Circuit upheld FACE after a Commerce Clause
challenge. 286 However, Judge Joseph Francis Weiss filed a lengthy dissent,
arguing that the holding in Morrison was "expansive" and that Lopez and
Morrison effectively foreclose the ability of Congress to "federaliz[e]...
local crime." 287  Judge Weiss conceded that abortion services are
commercial, but focused instead on the fact that FACE targets the activities
of protestors outside clinics, which, he argued, are not commercial
activities.288 Judge Weiss acknowledged that many courts have found
support for FACE by citing to Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v.
McClung,289 but distinguished those cases because the Civil Rights Act of
1964, at issue in both Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, governed the
actions of those who were engaged in the business of motel and restaurant
operation, not third parties.290 Further, Judge Weiss found the lack of a
jurisdictional element in FACE to be a "fatal flaw." 291
In United States v. Bird, Judge Harold DeMoss dissented from a decision
upholding FACE as a valid use of the Commerce power.292 Judge DeMoss
was primarily concerned with the fact that the activity regulated by FACE,
protesting and obstructing abortion clinics, was "intrastate and
281. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
282. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise . .
283. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
285. See United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 268-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (Weis, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 687-92 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 689-702 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
286. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253.
287. Id. at 268 (Weiss, J., dissenting).
288. Id.
289. See supra notes 65-66 for a discussion of Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta Motel.
290. Gregg, 226 F.3d at 268 (Weiss, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 271.
292. United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 685 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
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noncommercial conduct," and that in order for this kind of activity to be
reached under the Commerce Clause, Lopez had held that it must be an
integral part of a larger regulatory scheme regulating an economic
activity. 293 DeMoss emphasized that FACE was not part of a larger
regulatory scheme and that no other congressional legislation would be
"undercut" if Congress were not able to reach this kind of criminal
activity.294 Judge DeMoss argued that FACE failed to meet any of the
considerations laid out in Lopez, such as having a jurisdictional element or
regulating commercial activity, and therefore could not be considered
constitutional. 295 Judge DeMoss also argued that there could be no national
market in "abortion-related services," and that abortions could not be
viewed as commerce or trade.296  Judge DeMoss's critique is a
paradigmatic example of a Lopez/Morrison analysis that could be used in
analyzing FOCA or any other broadly drafted abortion regulation.
Some commentators have also argued that FACE involves several
traditional areas of state sovereignty, such as family law and criminal
law. 297 Professors David Kopel and Glenn Reynolds, who have written
extensively in support of the "new" federalism, 298 have pointed out that
"federalism makes a substantial contribution to domestic tranquility in the
United States" by allowing states to come to their own conclusions about
293. Id. at 685-86.
294. Id.
295. Judge Harold DeMoss argued as follows:
First, FACE is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
commerce. Second, FACE is not an essential part of any larger regulation of
economic activity, in which that larger regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated. Third, FACE contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure through case-by-case inquiry that the conduct
prohibited therein affects interstate commerce. Finally, FACE exercises general
police powers by creating criminal sanctions in an area where the states have
historically been recognized to be sovereign.
Id. at 687 (citations omitted).
296. Id. Judge DeMoss argued against understanding FACE as a regulation of commerce
involved in the "national market," arguing that the "national market" concept has been used
where goods are fungible and tradeable upon the market, such as shares of stock or bushels
of wheat. Id. Judge DeMoss does not view abortion as an exchange of goods or services in
the marketplace or as any other kind of commerce:
There is nothing in the Congressional Record that establishes that one abortion
procedure is just like every other abortion procedure. To the contrary, an abortion
is a unique, personal, and highly individualized procedure.... An abortion is a
medical/surgical procedure performed in a hospital or clinic by a provider on a
pregnant woman. There is no product or commodity which results from this
procedure. When a woman arranges to have an abortion performed, the subject of
the arrangement is a personal service that is to be provided. When the service is
rendered and the fee is paid, the abortion has no ongoing value or marketability.
Id. at 686-87.
297. See, e.g., Saylor, supra note 31, at 123.
298. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46; Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The
Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 Hastings Const. L.Q.
511 (2000); see also Denning & Reynolds, supra note 104; Reynolds & Denning, supra note
20.
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important moral issues, including the "hottest of hot buttons in American
politics," abortion.299 Kopel and Reynolds argue for the "non-infinity"
principle in analyzing the Commerce Clause: Statutes based on generic
rationales that could easily be extended to any area of the law should not be
upheld.30 0 These commentators agreed with Judge Coffey's dissent in
Wilson, which argued that FACE is unconstitutional because FACE
"offered nothing to distinguish abortion clinics from schools, churches,
houses of prostitution and private homes, all of which purchase goods that
were once sold across state lines." 30 1 These two commentators as well as
others argue that ultimately, creating the possibility of broader access to
rights-an expansive vision of the Commerce Clause that would allow
FACE, and probably FOCA or other broad legalizations, to be
constitutional-would not protect freedom as well as the "limited federal
power [that] is an important part of our constitutional scheme. ' 302
2. Restricting or Banning Abortion
The same considerations that apply to the issue of expanding access to
abortion would apply to the issue of restricting access to abortion. In
addition, of course, the constitutional right to privacy further limits the
ability of Congress or any legislature to restrict abortion. 30 3 The best
examples of existing or potential congressional restrictions on abortion are
the PBABA and a hypothetical complete ban on abortion if Roe were
overturned.
The PBABA was not accompanied by congressional findings on the
connection between the procedure to be regulated and commerce between
the states. 30 4 However, the PBABA does contain a jurisdictional element,
ostensibly limiting its coverage to those abortions that affect interstate
commerce, 305 and the House Judiciary Committee noted that Congress
derived its power to pass this legislation because so-called "partial-birth"
abortion is "an economic transaction in which a service is performed for a
fee."3 06
With respect to a blanket ban on abortion activity, any federal ban might
mirror some of the bans that are already on the books around the country.
For instance, Michigan has an unconstitutional ban on the books that
essentially makes performing an abortion a felony unless the life of the
299. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 111.
300. Id. at 98.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 116; see supra notes 22, 46 and accompanying text; see also Neal Devins, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 131, 133 (2004).
303. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
304. See Pushaw, supra note 26, at 325.
305. "Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly
performs a partial-birth abortion... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 2 years, or both." PBABA, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. III 2003).
306. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 326 (internal quotations omitted).
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pregnant woman is in danger. 30 7 A congressional ban would likely contain
some kind of jurisdictional element, perhaps stating that any person who
performs an abortion using an object or drug that has traveled in interstate
commerce would be guilty of a crime. In assessing such a law, a
Lopez/Morrison court would attempt to determine whether this ban was
closely related to interstate commerce or whether the jurisdictional element
was merely an attempt to bring a noneconomic event into the power of
Congress, as VAWA did.
30 8
Under Lopez and Morrison, the definition of "economic activity" appears
to be quite limited. As Justice Stevens's Lopez dissent recognizes, a gun is
an "article[] of commerce," in that it must have been generated in
commerce and can easily return into commerce. 30 9 However, the Lopez
majority held that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce" 3 10 and focused on the
precise source of the effect, rather than the practical connection to
commerce that may exist because of the law's effect. 3 11 Therefore, any
Lopez/Morrison analysis would appear to require a close reading of a
statute to determine precisely what activity is being regulated and whether
that activity itself is economic in nature. The next section will discuss how
these standards might be applied to the PBABA or to any kind of ban on
abortion services or abortion in general.
307. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.14 (West 2004). The Michigan statute states as
follows:
Any person who shall willfully administer to any pregnant woman any medicine,
drug, substance or thing whatever, or shall employ any instrument or other means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman, shall
be guilty of a felony, and in case the death of such pregnant woman be thereby
produced, the offense shall be deemed manslaughter.
Id.
308. As mentioned above, Congress has frequently banned activities that it has
determined are immoral or dangerous to the country at large. See supra note 260 and
accompanying text. Although these statutes have generally been upheld, see supra note 262
and accompanying text, some judges have found these laws to be unconstitutional after
Lopez. For example, in United States v. Rybar, then-Judge Alito filed a strong dissent,
arguing that the statute was "the closest extant relative of the statute struck down in Lopez,"
and that because this statute similarly contained no jurisdictional element or congressional
findings, it too should be struck down. 103 F.3d 273, 286-88 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
309. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
311. See id. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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a. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Abortion Restrictions, and
Lopez/Morrison
The PBABA regulates the actions of a physician by prohibiting any
physician from performing a so-called "partial-birth" abortion.312 This
activity could be considered economic in that the abortion being performed
is something for which the physician will be paid, an exchange of services
for money. However, it could just as easily be considered not economic
because the PBABA only prohibits the physician from performing a
particular kind of abortion, regulating only his or her choice of procedure
and not whether the procedure is going to be performed at all.313 One
commentator has argued that "[t]he performance of a partial-birth abortion
bears a close resemblance to the noneconomic possession of a gun,"
because neither one requires commerce to take place in order for the
activity-possessing a gun or performing an abortion procedure-to
occur. 314 This problem with the PBABA was discussed even during its
drafting, when Georgetown Law Professor Louis Seidman testified before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that "as in Lopez, [this] regulated
activity is not economic .... Just as Congress can regulate the interstate
purchase of guns but not their intrastate possession, so it would seem it can
regulate the interstate purchase of abortions but not the intrastate procedure
itself."315
Lopez and Morrison also focus on the non-infinity principle, meaning
that Congress should not base a law on a rationale that would provide
justification for any type of law with no limitations.316  Indeed,
commentators have argued that if the PBABA is upheld, then any
congressional ban on any other type of medical procedure would also be
upheld; therefore the PBABA exceeds the bounds of the "non-infinity"
principle.317 A ban on abortion would similarly pose the problem that
Congress could then theoretically reach any activity that could possibly be
paid for, which is potentially any activity at all.318
312. PBABA, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003).
313. Id.
314. Ides, supra note 27, at 446 (arguing that the procedure itself is noneconomic the
same way that gun possession is noneconomic, since guns generally travel in commerce but
on their own are not economic, and abortions may be paid for but on their own are not
inherently economic).
315. The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 260 (1995) (testimony of Professor of Law Louis Michael Seidman).
316. Kopel and Reynolds, supra note 46, at 70.
317. Id.
318. See Saylor, supra note 31, at 134. In fact, Justice O'Connor raised a similar concern
in her dissent in Raich, criticizing the Court for finding that personal, medical use of
marijuana at home substantially affected the market for marijuana. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195, 2225 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Most commercial goods or services have
some sort of privately producible analogue. Home care substitutes for daycare. Charades
games substitute for movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going
to the supermarket. To draw the line wherever private activity affects the demand for market
goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything economic.").
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Commentators have pointed out that the PBABA, although it contains a
jurisdictional element, does not link the statute to particular abortions
performed by physicians who have traveled across state lines or where the
patients have traveled across state lines, and thus is too broad to be
sufficiently linked to interstate commerce. 31 9 Commentators have also
noted that there are in fact very few so-called "partial-birth" abortions
performed each year, and thus even if they are considered to be economic
activity, even when aggregated, there is no substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 320  On the other hand, if an across-the-board ban on all
abortions were someday enacted, it would doubtless encompass sufficient
numbers of abortions to be considered enough to aggregate. 32 1
A Lopez/Morrison analysis also focuses on whether the activity is one
that is traditionally regulated by states.322 In terms of banning a particular
abortion procedure, a court with this perspective would likely recognize that
Congress has never before regulated or banned a specific medical
procedure, 323 and that the practice of medicine has traditionally been
regulated by the states.324 Abortion is also generally considered part of
family law, another area traditionally regulated by states.32 5 Both before
and after Roe, the only regulatory schemes covering abortion were imposed
by the states, as part of the regulation of the practice of medicine. 326
319. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 105. In challenging the PBABA, the plaintiffs
have also argued that the jurisdictional element is "impermissibly vague" and therefore
unconstitutional, but as yet this argument has not been reached by a court. See Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 975 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Professors Kopel and Reynolds joked that the only way the jurisdictional element in the
PBABA could really be applied is if "a physician... operat[ed] a mobile abortion clinic on
the Metroliner." Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 111.
320. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 105.
321. The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates that there are approximately 1.4 million
abortions performed in the United States each year. Henshaw et. al., supra note 243.
322. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Kreit and Marcus, supra note 116, at 967-71.
323. See Schecter, supra note 27, at 2019 (noting that this is the first "legislation
criminalizing a medical procedure" and citing Sen. Dianne Feinstein's comments during
debate on the bill).
324. Kreit & Marcus, supra note 116, at 977-92; see also Noah, supra note 43, at 158-65
(discussing how states are generally considered to have "primacy" in regulating the practice
of medicine, including licensing of physicians).
325. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 72.
326. Although Congress did get involved in this area early on with the Comstock Laws in
1873, banning the sending of information about sexuality, birth control and abortion through
the mails, states have always been the primary regulators in this area of the law. Alexander
Sanger, Beyond Choice 28 (2004). State laws modeled on the Comstock Laws went further
than the federal law (arguably the federal law went as far as it could) and banned the
distribution of contraceptives and provision of abortions. Id. at 34. Between 1873 and 1973,
when Roe was decided, states had vastly different laws governing abortion, and that is still
true now, as all fifty states have a variety of different regulations, including waiting periods,
"informed consent" laws, parental consent or notification laws, and other types of
restrictions. See Felicia H. Stewart & Philip D. Damey, Abortion: Teaching Why as Well as
How, 35 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 1 (2003), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3503703.pdf.
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Several commentators have argued that under the Lopez/Morrison analysis,
abortion is an activity that "has traditionally been left to the states," being
part of family law and healthcare, and thus would not be found within the
reach of the Commerce Clause under this analysis.327 These commentators
have also noted that the PBABA purports to regulate violent crime by
criminalizing an abortion procedure, and that both Lopez and Morrison
described prosecuting violent crime as being within the purview of the
states.32
8
While the PBABA, for example, does not have identical flaws to either
the gun law in Lopez or the VAWA in Morrison,329 it has a combination of
flaws, including a difficult-to-apply jurisdictional element330 and findings
that are unrelated to commerce, which might make a Lopez court think
twice before upholding it.331 Using a Lopez/Morrison methodology, it
would seem that a court would have serious trouble hurdling the twin
barriers of traditional state regulation and the non-infinity principle. With
both the PBABA and some kind of across-the-board ban, the logic behind
the laws could certainly lead to a far more expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause than the Court appeared willing to countenance in Lopez
and Morrison.332
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CANNOT BOTH ALLOW PROTECTION OF
ABORTION RIGHTS AND PREVENT RESTRICTION OF THEM: PRO-CHOICE
ADVOCATES MUST USE THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND NOT THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO COMBAT CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF
ABORTION
As described in Part II, there are strong arguments on both sides of the
federalism debate for limiting or broadening the reach of the Commerce
Clause. Traditionally, the debate has broken down along political lines:
Liberals tend to advocate for a broader understanding of the Commerce
Clause because it enables Congress to legislate in areas where states have
327. Ides, supra note 27, at 452-55; see also Schecter, supra note 27, at 2019.
328. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-14 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 564-66 (1995); Ides, supra note 27, at 452-55; Schecter, supra note 27, at
2019.
329. See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 319.
33 1. See supra note 305 for the relevant statutory language.
332. The PBABA has been challenged on constitutional grounds, and three circuit courts
have already struck it down based on Stenberg v. Carhart. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales,
435 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir.
2005). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in an appeal from two of these decisions
and will be hearing these cases in the 2006-2007 Term. Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood,
126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006); Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). None of the parties
have challenged the Act as an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause, and the Court is
unlikely to raise the issue of the Commerce Clause sua sponte, but it is possible that it will
be raised in briefs supporting the appeal.
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tended to be less responsive, 333 while conservatives embrace a narrower
understanding of the Commerce Clause as granting more power to the
states.334 Before Lopez and the rest of the "federalist revolution," both
Congress and the Court had been increasing federal powers, creating and
upholding national solutions for national problems.33 5 Until the current
Congress and President were elected, this approach was preferred by
progressives and liberals, who have defended everything from the
Endangered Species Act to the proposed Freedom of Choice Act and the
Freedom to Access Clinic Entrances Act, as valid uses of the Commerce
Clause. 336
However, the new conservative leadership in Washington has made
states' rights arguments attractive to progressives, especially in the areas of
same-sex marriage and abortion.337 The current state of politics has caused
progressives to look for solutions in new places, and that has coincided with
the two "new" federalist Commerce Clause cases, giving abortion advocates
and others another avenue from which to approach unfavorable
congressional legislation. However, this part argues that creating national
solutions to national problems was and is the best approach to ensuring
rights for Americans, from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Clean Water
Act to FACE.
If current Congress members, with their admittedly broad Commerce
power, are likely to pass legislation that threatens the rights of individuals,
there are two solutions. First, fight the legislation on other grounds,
including fighting to protect the important constitutional rights that have
already been established, and second, replace the members of Congress.
A. The Problem of Progressive (and Conservative) Flip-Flopping
As some commentators have recognized, there is a temptation to switch
sides, so to speak, when legal arguments that were used successfully by one
side of an ideological debate suddenly become useable to defend the other
side.338 This kind of legal "flip-flopping" has been true not just of
progressives in recent years, but of conservatives as well.339 The PBABA,
while it may fit within Congress's Commerce power, seems to violate the
333. See Law, supra note 7, at 372, 408.
334. See Schwartz, supra note 13; Kmiec, supra note 17.
335. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act against a Commerce
Clause challenge); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a Commerce Clause challenge).
336. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
338. See Law, supra note 7, at 372; Devins, supra note 302, at 131-37; Moreno, supra
note 22, at 742-43.
339. See Schram, supra note 22 ("Conservatives who... [were] opposed to legalizing
any homosexual marriages argued that this was a matter of national values that must be
governed by one national policy that defines a marriage as only a union of male and female
couples.").
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commitment to states' rights that many of its proponents generally
espouse. 340 Some critics allege that the Defense of Marriage Act shares the
same flaws. 341 According to one commentator, this kind of federalism
"flip-flopping" has occurred throughout history and has depended chiefly
on which party controlled the national government and which controlled
more of the state governments. 342 At times when a party controls the
national government, that party tends to favor federal controls, while the
party out of power prefers leaving major issues to the states.343
While advocates, lawmakers, and lawyers can afford to take divergent
positions in different cases or on different pieces of legislation, the Supreme
Court cannot. Once the Court has decided on a particular position, the
doctrine of stare decisis dictates that that position will probably remain
constant. Advocates and lawyers who push for change should be aware that
their advocacy has far-reaching consequences, and if they manage to
convince the Court or lower courts that, for example, the PBABA is an
unconstitutional use of the Commerce power, they will have helped to
create precedent that could and probably would be used to strike down
legislation that is as important to reproductive rights as the PBABA is
damaging.344 There is some evidence that advocates in the pro-choice
movement, at least, are already aware of this danger, based on the fact that
the cases challenging the PBABA have not raised the Commerce Clause as
a grounds for striking down the Act, 345 and have used the Commerce
Clause to defend FACE.346 While several commentators have urged
progressive advocates to adopt the Lopez/Morrison strategy 347 the fall-out
from such an approach could be monumentally damaging to some of the
most important gains made by civil rights groups and progressive causes in
the last fifty years. 348
B. The "Neutral Approach" to the Commerce Clause
The problem with inserting ideology into jurisprudence is that it seems to
lead to messy and "unworkable" results. 349 By overlaying a strict belief in
federalism over seventy years of reliance on Commerce Clause
340. See Devins, supra note 302, at 133-34; Moreno, supra note 22, at 742-43.
341. See Rothstein, supra note 22, at 578; Bash, supra note 22, at 985.
342. Devins, supra note 302, at 134-35 (pointing to, among other issues, the states' rights
attitude of abolitionists at the time when slave interests controlled federal power, as in the
case of the Fugitive Slave Act, and the reversal of these positions after the Civil War).
343. Id.
344. See Law, supra note 7, at 421-23.
345. See supra note 332.
346. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
347. See Dailey, supra note 27, at 1888; Hankersley, supra note 27, at 21; Schecter, supra
note 27, at 2024-25.
348. See Batt, supra note 72, at 318-39 ("Should Congress be permitted to extend its
Commerce Clause authority to preempt state laws for moral and social preferences? The
answer is a bittersweet 'Yes.' . . . Without [the New Deal Commerce Clause interpretations]
much of our federal civil rights legislation would be unconstitutional .....
349. See Law, supra note 7, at 372; Saylor, supra note 31, at 58-59.
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jurisprudence, the Supreme Court caused serious confusion, or what some
have alleged may be all-out rebellion, in the lower courts. 350 Even Raich,
which appears to be a retreat from the hard line taken in Lopez and
Morrison, has raised more questions than it has answered in terms of what
Congress can permissibly accomplish with its Commerce power.35 1 The
dissent's complaint that after Raich, Lopez no longer provides meaningful
limits on congressional power but has become a mere "drafting guide,"
appears to be a fair criticism, since one of the only significant differences
between the cases is that the statute in Raich is part of a broader regulatory
package. 352 Otherwise, it might be difficult to determine why a statute
making it illegal to possess a firearm in a particular place is
unconstitutional, 353 whereas a statute making it illegal to possess marijuana
is constitutional. 354
The Court will have to provide further clarification at some point. A
number of possibilities exist: The Court could return to the strict and
difficult-to-apply tests created in Lopez and Morrison; it could return to the
pre-Lopez view of the Commerce Clause, which gave great deference to
Congress; or it could adopt one of the suggested standards discussed in Part
I, such as a "hard look" type of standard. 355  Whatever test the Court
decides to apply next, it must make clear that while the Commerce Clause
is not all-powerful, it is sufficient to reach those activities that affect the
evolving national economy. The Lopez/Morrison shift toward looking at
the nature of the regulated activity rather than at its effect was untrue to the
precedent of the post-New Deal cases,3 56 and appeared to limit Congress's
power to regulate a national economy that is increasingly interconnected
with many seemingly "noneconomic" activities. 357
For example, although VAWA did not regulate strictly commercial
activity, congressional findings indicated that because violence against
women impacts the national economy by keeping women workers at home
and out of interstate travel, violence against women does have an effect on
the national economy. 35 8 Conversely, in the text and legislative findings of
CSA, there was no showing that personal, medicinal use of marijuana has
350. See generally Denning & Reynolds, supra note 104; Reynolds & Denning, supra
note 20.
351. See Parry, supra note 17, at 862; Pushaw, supra note 18, at 884; Reynolds &
Denning, supra note 48, at 916.
352. See supra notes 110-43 and accompanying text.
353. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local
school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.").
354. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005).
355. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 90, 132 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 109, 132 and accompanying text.
358. Saylor, supra note 31, at 71 (noting that the Morrison dissent argued that "Congress
assembled a 'mountain of data' showing the effects of violence against women on interstate
commerce").
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any effect on the national economy. 359 It seems clear that a post-New Deal
"rational basis" review would have upheld both VAWA and CSA.
However, it is possible that a "hard look" Commerce Clause test 360 that did
not try to incorporate the Lopez/Morrison factors at all would have struck
down CSA as applied to the respondents in Raich, but would have upheld
the civil lawsuit provision in VAWA because Congress had given it serious
attention and deliberation.
The difficulty in creating a workable test should signal that this is not an
area that lends itself well to judicial solutions. However, now that the Court
has reentered the field, it is important that it create "a better and more
honest explanation" for rejecting some part of the post-New Deal
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 361 Even before Raich, the lower courts,
which are the day-to-day decision makers as to the limits of the Commerce
Clause, seemed to not be applying Lopez or Morrison at all because of the
absence of a clear test.362 After Raich, it will probably be even more
difficult to apply the Court's jurisprudence, and while lower courts are
waiting for more guidance, they will likely end up having to choose which
case they agree with more. 363
Whatever this Court may believe, it is fairly clear that having federal
judges create their own standard in each Commerce Clause case is not the
best solution. Rather than leave this problem to the judges, this is an area
best left, except in extreme circumstances, to the political branches of
government. 364 The balance between state and federal authority can be
reached through the political process, as elected officials and those who
elect them make their voices heard. As the dissenters in Morrison stated,
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the
aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The fact of
such substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the first instance,
but for Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence...
far exceeds ours. 365
A court's role is to assess whether the conclusion reached by Congress
that there is a jurisdictional basis for the legislation is "rational. 366 While
the majority of the Court in Lopez and Morrison disagreed with that
359. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Even if intrastate cultivation
and possession of marijuana for one's own medicinal use can properly be characterized as
economic, and I question whether it can, it has not been shown that such activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. Similarly, it is neither self-evident nor
demonstrated that regulating such activity is necessary to the interstate drug control
scheme.").
360. Breyer, supra note 82, at 64-65.
361. Killenbeck, supra note 81, at 58.
362. See generally Denning & Reynolds, supra note 104; Reynolds & Denning, supra
note 20.
363. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 48, at 917-20.
364. See Saylor, supra note 31, at 58-61.
365. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
366. Id.
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conception of the Court's role, Raich reaffirms the idea that the Court
should not be in the position of second-guessing every aspect of
congressional use of the Commerce power: "In assessing the scope of
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task
before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding."
36 7
The "rational basis" test may lead to upholding legislation that appears to
blur the lines between federal and state authority, but it also allows
Congress and the states to come to a natural balance where national issues
can be addressed through national action; a "hard look" doctrine would
likely reach the same result. 368 As demonstrated by Morrison, where thirty-
five states petitioned the Court to uphold Congress's ability to create a civil
remedy for gender-motivated violence, and New York v. United States,
3 69
where the states fought against federal intrusion into their sovereignty,
states and Congress are capable of deciding for themselves when the lines
of power are crossed.370 If Congress gives the issue serious deliberative
thought, Congress deserves deference to its role in the democratic
process. 37 1
In terms of national abortion legislation, while it may be unpalatable to
either or both sides of the debate, abortion services fit most definitions of
commerce, and the patchwork of abortion statutes at the state level makes it
the kind of commerce that is more likely than most to encourage interstate
activity. 372 However, the fact that Congress may have the power to regulate
abortion does not necessarily mean that it should use it. As several
commentators who support a narrower reading of the Commerce Clause
have pointed out, one of the things that keeps our nation whole is allowing
different states to resolve moral and social issues on their own.3 73 There are
those in Congress who believe in a limited role for the federal government,
especially in areas where states are generally considered to be sovereign. 374
At the same time, there are those in Congress who believe that abortion
rights should be protected. 3 75 The existence of these two, generally distinct,
groups provides reason to hope that Congress would not use the Commerce
power to ban abortion even if it was constitutionally permitted to do so.
367. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005).
368. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
369. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
370. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
371. Id.
372. See Sanger, supra note 326, at 51; see also FOCA, S. 2593, H.R. 5151, 109th Cong.
§ 2 (2006).
373. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
374. See Editorial, The Contract, Partly Fulfilled, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1995, at A12
(discussing how the Republican majority won Congress in 1994 based on a "Contract with
America" that focused on giving power back to the states).
375. See S.2593, H.R. 5151.
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CONCLUSION
Raich by no means signals the total demise of the "new" federalist
approach to the Commerce Clause, but it does indicate that the Court is
retreating from its decade-old Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 376 While
the Commerce Clause does not give Congress police powers, it does
empower Congress to regulate our increasingly interconnected and
interdependent national economy. 377  Lower courts should follow the
Supreme Court's lead and not strike down valid congressional statutes
based on the Lopez and Morrison decisions. In addition, as the pro-choice
community looks for solutions to the possibility of a post-Roe world,
changing the balance of power in Congress, rather than preventing it from
acting on some of the other important issues facing our nation, should be
the first priority.
376. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B.2.
377. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005).
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